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VISUAL METAPHOR AND TRADEMARK 
DISTINCTIVENESS 
 
Dustin Marlan* 
Abstract: Perhaps because words are the lawyer’s principal instrument, the law gives too 
little attention to visual images. Invoking Justice Potter Stewart’s infamous statement 
regarding the law’s inability to define obscenity, “I know it when I see it” is the standard for 
interpreting images in the law. A greater understanding of the ways in which images make 
meaning is needed, however, including in trademark law given our increasingly visual 
economy. 
This Article examines images in the context of trademark law’s inherent distinctiveness 
doctrine. While trademark law still lacks a coherent, uniform, and predictable framework for 
deciding the distinctiveness of visual image marks—logos and product packaging—it has long 
used the “imagination” test to effectively determine a word mark’s distinctiveness. Under the 
imagination test, immediately protectable word marks must operate in a metaphorical 
relationship to the words from which they are drawn (i.e., as figures of speech), requiring 
consumers to use their imagination to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods or 
services offered under the marks (e.g., “Klondike” for ice cream and “Greyhound” for a bus 
service). This makes sense because the first requirement of a valid trademark is that it be a 
“symbol,” and, as this Article shows, the basic characteristic of any symbol is its figurative 
quality. Research in conceptual metaphor theory finds, though, that metaphor is “primarily a 
matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language.” Indeed, brands rely 
not just on verbal metaphor, but also on visual metaphor to differentiate themselves from 
competitors in the marketplace (e.g., Target’s “bullseye” and Starbucks’s “siren”). 
This Article thus claims that visual metaphor provides a figurative, cognition-based vehicle 
by which to extend trademark law’s imagination test of inherent distinctiveness from words to 
images. In doing so, it conceives of metaphorical association as a central consideration in 
analyzing the inherent distinctiveness of both word and image marks. 
 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law (2018–present); Clinical 
Teaching Fellow, University of Michigan Law School (2016–2018). Thanks to Alicia Alvarez, Barton 
Beebe, Michael Bloom, Adam Candeub, Tuneen Chisolm, Anne Choike, Brent Droze, Rebecca 
Eisenberg, Daniel Gandert, Jake Gober, Samir Hanna, Gautam Hans, Paul Heald, Carrie Hempel, 
Laura Heymann, Brian Krumm, Raven Lanier, Jake Linford, Jessica Litman, Lydia Loren, Michael 
Madison, Joseph Miller, Sean Pager, Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Lisa Ramsey, Jason Rantanen, Alexandra 
Roberts, Guy Rub, Sharon Sandeen, Irene SanPietro, Rebecca Tushnet, Jason Zhu, and participants 
at the Michigan State Ninth Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property (JSIP) Workshop, the 
2017 AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education, and the New Hampshire Seventh Annual 
Intellectual Property Scholars’ Roundtable for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to 
Stephen Handlon, Raven Lanier, and Jason Zhu for providing invaluable research assistance. 
Responsibility for—literally—all errors remains with the author.  
  
Marlan – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
768 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:767 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 768 
I. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR AND THE FIGURATIVE 
DIMENSIONS OF COMMERCE ......................................... 776 
A. Conceptual Metaphor Theory ..................................... 778 
B. Verbal and Visual Metaphor in Advertising and 
Branding ..................................................................... 781 
C. Trade Symbolism ........................................................ 789 
II. VERBAL METAPHOR AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS  
OF WORD MARKS .............................................................. 794 
A. The Abercrombie Spectrum ........................................ 795 
B. The Imagination Test .................................................. 799 
C. Alternative Tests for Determining Inherent 
Distinctiveness ............................................................ 802 
III. VISUAL METAPHOR AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS  
OF IMAGE MARKS ............................................................. 804 
A. Image Marks: Logos and Trade Dress ........................ 805 
B. Current Tests for Determining the Inherent 
Distinctiveness of Image Marks Are Insufficient ....... 807 
C. Proposal: An Imagination Test of Visual Metaphor ... 814 
1. The Representation of a Person, Place, Thing,  
or Idea ................................................................... 819 
2. By Means of a Visual Image .............................. 820 
3. That Suggests a Particular Association or Point  
of Similarity as to Its Underlying Goods or        
Services ................................................................. 821 
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS ................................................. 822 
A. Abstraction ................................................................. 822 
B. Import of the Imagination Test ................................... 823 
C. Symbolic Consumption .............................................. 824 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 825 
 
 
 
 
 
  
08 - Marlan(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
2018] VISUAL METAPHOR AND DISTINCTIVENESS 769 
 
 
What we call a symbol is a term, a name, or even a picture that 
may be familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific 
connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning. 
—C.G. Jung1 
 
The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the 
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by 
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. 
—Frankfurter, J.2 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in an age where visual images dominate commerce and 
branding, yet trademark law fails to properly analyze image marks (e.g., 
logos and product packaging).3 The Patent and Trademark Office 
classifies all trademark applications into reductive word-based 
categories.4 Even the leading trademark treatise, invoking Justice Potter 
Stewart’s infamous statement regarding the law’s inability to define 
obscenity,5 resorts to “I know it when I see it” judgments in determining 
the similarity of appearance between image marks.6 Rebecca Tushnet, one 
of few intellectual property scholars to squarely address images, aptly 
                                                     
1. CARL G. JUNG, MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS 3 (5th prtg. 1971). 
2. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 203 (1942). 
3. See infra section III.B. 
4. See, e.g., Donna K. Hopkins, Searching for Graphic Content in USPTO Trademark Databases, 
25 WORLD PAT. INFO. 107, 107–08 (2003) (explaining the PTO’s trademark classification system of 
design codes, which relies largely on using words to describe image marks); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 873 
(2011) (“Images enter into this legal system, not exactly as an afterthought, but as a category in need 
of discipline through words. Registration for trademarks, unlike that for copyrights, involves entry 
into a detailed classification scheme and, therefore, requires all marks to be described in words, at 
least in part.”).  
5. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I know [obscenity] when 
I see it.”). 
6. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:25, at 
23–166 (“Obviously, for picture and design marks (as opposed to word marks), similarity of 
appearance is controlling. There is no point in launching into a long analysis of the judicial pros and 
cons regarding visual similarity of marks. Regarding visual similarity, all one can say is ‘I know it 
when I see it.’” (footnotes omitted)) [hereinafter 4 MCCARTHY]; see also id. at 23–165 (“Similarity 
of appearance between marks is really nothing more than a subjective ‘eyeball’ test.” (footnote 
omitted)); cf. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 876 (remarking that the eyeball test “is a statement about 
power: it is infringement when the fact finder sees infringement. It’s also, therefore, necessarily a 
statement about unpredictability”). 
Marlan – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
770 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:767 
 
 
notes that “images can make claims, just as words do.”7 Words, however, 
remain “the prototypical regulatory subjects for trademark and advertising 
law, despite our increasingly audiovisual economy.”8 
As such, trademark law has long used the “imagination” test to 
distinguish descriptive word marks, which are unprotectable absent 
secondary meaning, from distinctive ones eligible for protection upon first 
use in commerce.9 Under the imagination test, a word mark is considered 
inherently distinctive if the mark is a verbal metaphor (i.e., a figure of 
speech) that suggests qualities, values, or aesthetics relating to its 
associated product or service.10 Examples include “Klondike” for ice 
                                                     
7. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 917; see also Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images 
and the Right of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 157–204 (2015) (explaining that the law, 
whose prototypical object of regulation is words, has difficulty when governing images—including 
in the context of the right of publicity); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 685 (2012) (“Taking words as the prototypical subject matter of 
copyright has continuing consequences for copyright law, which often misconceives its object, 
resulting in confusion and incoherence.”). 
8. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 862; see also Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1699 (2014) (“Words, not images, are a lawyer’s most essential tool.”). 
9. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 4–9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
10. See, e.g., Synergistic Int’l, Inc. v. Windshield Doctor, Inc., No. CV 03-579 FMC (CWx), 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2003) (finding the mark “Glass Doctor” for glass 
installation and repair services to be suggestive given the “creative metaphorical combination of the 
terms ‘Doctor’ and ‘Glass’”); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“When choosing what to call the article, the creator of the suggestive name 
meaningfully fixes upon associational terms that will identify the product figuratively and will appeal 
to the consumer by allusion and metaphor.”); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark 
Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671 (2004) (“Suggestive marks, such as ATLAS for moving services or 
ROACH MOTEL for insect traps, are textbook metaphors and are described as such by the 
doctrine.”); Laura A. Heymann, A Name I Call Myself: Creativity and Naming, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
585, 603 (2012) [hereinafter Heymann, A Name I Call Myself] (“[T]he inherent strength of a mark 
(and therefore whether it gets protection ab initio or requires additional evidence) depends on how 
creative the mark is. The mark might be a commonplace and dull description of the good’s qualities 
or characteristics (and therefore might need to be used by others), or use metaphor to suggest a good’s 
characteristics, or create a new meaning for an existing word.”); Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar 
of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1330 (2010) [hereinafter Heymann, The Grammar 
of Trademarks] (“[T]he concept of metaphor is fundamental to how most trademarks work. Except 
for words invented to serve as trademarks—such as ‘Kodak’ and ‘Xerox’—all trademarks, being 
words in the English language, operate on a level other than a literal one in that they require consumers 
to use a familiar word or expression in a new and initially unfamiliar context.”); Jake Linford, The 
False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive Marks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1372 n.29 
(2015) (“Suggestive marks are . . . metaphorically related to the good or service sold, like using 
GLEEM to sell toothpaste indirectly invokes the bright, shiny quality one could expect from 
thoroughly cleaned teeth.”); cf. Alexandra J. Roberts, How to Do Things with Word Marks: A Speech-
Act Theory of Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1048 (2014) (arguing that “fact finders often 
focus unduly on mark selection, fixing on the employment of double entendre, incongruity, rhyme, 
metaphor, alliteration, or other rhetorical device as evidence that a mark is distinctive”). 
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cream and “Greyhound” for bus services. Because marks are symbols11—
and the sine qua non of a symbol is its figurative quality12—trademark law 
properly uses a figure of speech as its doctrinal trigger in evaluating the 
distinctiveness of word marks. Yet, despite our increasingly visual 
                                                     
11. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (explaining the “requirements 
for qualification of a word or symbol as a trademark are that it be (1) a ‘symbol,’ (2) ‘use[d] . . . as a 
mark,’ (3) ‘to identify and distinguish the seller’s goods from goods made or sold by others,’ but that 
it not be ‘functional’” (emphasis added) (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.1 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter 1 MCCARTHY])) ; see also, 
e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (“The 
protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is 
true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them.”); Duraco Prods., Inc. 
v. Joy Plastics Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that a distinctive trademark or 
trade dress must be “a symbol according to which one can relate the signifier (the trademark, or 
perhaps the packaging) to the signified (the product)”); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 860 F. 
Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Trademarks are symbols—
symbols of products and their origins. When a trademark is successfully employed, favorable 
associations accrue not only to its referent—the product or source for which the trademark stands—
but also to the trademark itself.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, 
So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 124 (1996) (noting author’s criticism of “case law for paying insufficient 
attention to the expressive dimension of trademarks, to their powerful role in the vocabulary as 
metaphors and symbols”). See generally Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of 
Trademarks—From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301–40 (1992). 
12. 4 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 17:1 (4th ed. 2002). 
Beyond the law of trademarks, the figurative requirement of the symbol is consistent across 
disciplines. Noteworthy definitions include the following by experts in hermeneutics, mythology, 
psychoanalysis, theory of metaphor, and narrative theory. See JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE SYMBOL 
WITHOUT MEANING 153 (1958) (“[A] symbol, like everything else, shows a double aspect. We must 
distinguish, therefore between the ‘sense’ and the ‘meaning’ of the symbol.”); JOLANDE JACOBI, 
COMPLEX/ARCHETYPE/SYMBOL IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF C.G. JUNG 77 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1959) 
(equating the terms “symbol” and “metaphor,” and noting that “[t]he word symbol (symbolon), 
derived from the Greek verb symballo, has long been the object of the most diverse definitions and 
interpretations. But all these definitions and interpretations are agreed that symbols present an 
objective, visible meaning behind which an invisible, profounder meaning is hidden” (emphasis in 
original)); JUNG, supra note 1, at 3 (“What we call a symbol is a term, a name, or even a picture that 
may be familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific connotations in addition to its conventional 
and obvious meaning.”); Paul Ricoeur, Existence and Hermeneutics, in THE CONFLICT OF 
INTERPRETATIONS: ESSAYS IN HERMENEUTICS 3, 12–13 (Don Ihde ed., Kathleen McLaughlin trans., 
1974) (“I define ‘symbol’ as any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning 
designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can 
be apprehended only through the first.” (emphasis omitted)); HEINRICH R. ZIMMER, PHILOSOPHIES 
OF INDIA 1–2 (1951) (“Concepts and words are symbols, just as visions, rituals, and images are; so 
too are the manners and customs of daily life. Through all of these a transcendent reality is mirrored. 
They are so many metaphors reflecting and implying something which, though thus variously 
expressed, is ineffable, though thus rendered multiform, remains inscrutable.”).  
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economy, the trademark regime lacks a coherent, uniform, and predictable 
mechanism for deciding the distinctiveness of image marks.13 
However, insights in cognitive linguistics and psychology reveal that 
“metaphor” does not refer merely to figurative language, but instead to a 
fundamental mode of thought characterized as understanding one concept 
“in terms of another.”14 And, in addition to verbal metaphor, modern 
brands rely heavily on visual metaphor—the visual representation of 
metaphorical concepts and thoughts—to differentiate themselves in the 
                                                     
13. See, e.g., Forney Indus. v. Daco of Mo., Inc., 835 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2016) (“The law 
relating to whether a trademark is inherently distinctive is more developed for word marks than it is 
for trade dress.”). Certain courts apply the Abercrombie spectrum to image marks. See, e.g., McNeil 
Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 378, 389 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Best 
Cellars, Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Other courts 
apply the Seabrook test. See, e.g., Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 
F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1004 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010). Yet others apply both tests. See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 
F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2001); Ashley Furniture Indus. v. Sangiacomo N.A., 187 F.3d 363, 370–71 (4th 
Cir. 1999). Still others apply neither. See, e.g., Forney Indus., 835 F.3d at 1245–46, 1252; Mexican 
Food Specialties, Inc. v. Festida Foods, Ltd., 953 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Mich. 1997).  
14. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980) (emphasis omitted); 
see also CHARLES FORCEVILLE, PICTORIAL METAPHOR IN ADVERTISING 4–6 (1996); Jacqueline C. 
Hitchon, The Locus of Metaphorical Persuasion: An Empirical Test, JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. 
Q. 55, 64 (1997); Edward F. McQuarrie & Barbara J. Phillips, Indirect Persuasion in Advertising: 
How Consumers Process Metaphors Presented in Pictures and Words, 34 J. ADVERT. 7, 9 (2005). 
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marketplace.15 Examples include Apple’s logo,16 Starbucks’s siren,17 and 
Nike’s swoosh.18 As with verbal metaphor in the word mark context, use 
of visual metaphor enables an image mark to serve as an inherent source 
identifier by (1) denoting (referring literally to) a brand, as well as (2) 
                                                     
15. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 204; see also FORCEVILLE, supra note 14, at 5–7; 
Hitchon, supra note 14, at 74; McQuarrie & Phillips, supra note 14, at 9. 
16.  
    
Apple, Inc., Apple Logo, 1998; Tiziano Vecellio, The Fall of Man, 1550. 
17.  
  
Starbucks Corp., Starbucks Logo, 2011; Audio2Visual Contest, A Siren’s Call: A Little Bit Closer, 
Contest Image, 2014, https://www.flickr.com/photos/rinoa_cathcart [https://perma.cc/BV7Q-8ZLT]. 
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connoting (suggesting or implying, but not describing) characteristics 
associated with a marked product or service.19 
This Article thus argues that visual metaphor provides a figurative, 
cognition-based vehicle by which to extend trademark law’s imagination 
test from word to image marks. To this end, it proposes a test to decide 
the validity of an image mark—at least in part and where at issue—on 
whether the image contains a visual metaphor, i.e., able to convey one or 
more positive features or connotations about its associated product or 
service. In this way, the Article conceives of metaphor, in its conceptual 
aspect, as a central consideration in analyzing inherent distinctiveness 
regardless of the type of trade symbol at issue. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains that metaphor is 
fundamental to thought and is used prominently in advertising. It first 
marshals cognitive linguistics and psychology research, finding that 
“metaphor” does not refer merely to figurative language, but rather to a 
phenomenon of thought capable of visual expression. It next demonstrates 
how conceptual metaphor, especially in its visual aspect, is used in 
advertising and branding as an attractive means of drawing consumer 
attention. Part I lastly discusses the function of the trademark as a symbol 
and thus its deep-seated connection to metaphor. 
Part II examines verbal metaphor as it relates to the distinctiveness of 
word marks. It first demonstrates the Abercrombie spectrum to be a 
“hierarchy of figurativeness.” This Part next discusses the imagination test 
                                                     
18.  
  
Nike, Inc., Nike Logo, 1995; Nike, Goddess of Victory, 500 B.C.E. 
19. See Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO. L.J., 731, 737–38 (2017) 
(“Trademarks operate on at least these two levels. First, the mark denotes source—it indicates ‘a 
single thing coming from a single source.’ Second, because the mark points to a consistent, if 
anonymous source, it also connotes or hints at qualities of the marked product. What the mark denotes 
and connotes in turn is determined in part by the symbol appropriated for use as a trademark.”).  
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as an implicit test of a word mark’s metaphorical significance. Part II 
concludes by examining some lesser-used alternatives to the imagination 
test—the dictionary test and the competitor’s need test. 
Part III applies visual metaphor to image marks. It provides relevant 
background on image marks—logos and trade dress. It next describes 
current tests for the inherent distinctiveness of image marks and concludes 
that each is inadequate. Part III lastly proposes instead a test of threshold 
validity, when at issue, based on metaphor theory. To this end, it proposes 
that trademark law adopt a definitional test of visual metaphor to decide 
the validity of an image mark based, at least in part, on whether it is (1) 
the representation of a person, place, thing, or idea, (2) by means of a 
visual image, (3) that suggests a particular association or point of 
similarity as to its underlying product or service. 
Part IV responds to three potential objections to the use of visual 
metaphor as a test for inherent image mark distinctiveness: that such a test 
(1) is unduly abstract and subjective, (2) seeks to extend an incoherent 
word mark framework, and (3) wrongly promotes “symbolic 
consumption,” or the tendency of consumers to focus on meanings beyond 
the tangible characteristics of goods and services to a deleterious effect on 
culture. Part V concludes the Article. 
A note on terminology before proceeding. This Article uses the term 
“metaphor” in the spirit of conceptual metaphor theorists George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson’s formulation: “[t]he essence of metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”20 
This broad conceptualization of metaphor involves comparisons or 
systems of concepts where one thing is understood in terms of another, or 
which are deviations from the literal use of a word or concept.21 These 
may also include analogy, simile, wordplay, and pun. An example of a 
conceptual metaphor employed as a trademark is the word mark 
GREYHOUND, or alternatively the visual image of a greyhound, for bus 
services. The term “greyhound” or its visual depiction each clearly 
suggest the efficient nature of the services offered. However, a conceptual 
metaphor in the trademark sense might also consist of an incongruity, as 
                                                     
20. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 5 (emphasis omitted); cf. Metaphor, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/metaphor [https://perma.cc/Z6HD-5E8H] 
(“[A] figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used 
in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them (as in drowning in money); broadly: 
figurative language—compare simile.”).  
21. See, e.g., McQuarrie & Phillips, supra note 14, at 9 (adapting this broad view of metaphor and 
applying it in the advertising context).  
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is typical of arbitrary marks. For example, consider the word mark 
CHERRY, or alternatively the visual image of a cherry, used in 
connection with hammers or other hand tools.22 In this way, figurative 
language or thought may be applied in branding, for rhetorical effect, in a 
manner that significantly departs from conventional usage.23 
I. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR AND THE FIGURATIVE 
DIMENSIONS OF COMMERCE 
This Part reviews conceptual metaphor theory and its application to 
advertising and branding and trade symbols. Section I.A examines 
metaphor as a phenomenon of thought rather than of figurative language. 
It lays foundation for the claim that trademark law’s imagination test has 
applicability to image marks through use of visual metaphor. Indeed, 
metaphor has been called “the language of the imagination.”24 The word 
metaphor is derived from the Greek words “meta,” meaning “over,” and 
“pherein,” or “to carry.”25 This “carrying over” describes the import of 
one concept to another, which results in a meaning that integrates the two. 
As the founders of conceptual metaphor theory, cognitive linguist George 
Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson, explain, “the essence of metaphor 
                                                     
22. Many thanks to Laura Heymann for suggesting this point of clarification. 
23. The Article also draws a distinction between a metaphor and a metonym. Metonyms—like 
metaphors—are technically figurative rather than literal depictions. But, instead of understanding one 
thing in terms of another as with metaphor, a part stands for a whole or vice versa in metonymy. 
Examples of metonyms include the statements “the White House announced today . . .” and “she’s 
just a pretty face,” or referring to a business executive as a “suit.” For a thorough discussion of the 
differences between metaphor and metonymy, see generally, for example, METAPHOR AND 
METONYMY AT THE CROSSROADS: A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE (Antonio Barcelona ed., 2003); 
METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN COMPARISON AND CONTRAST (René Dirven & Ralf Pörings eds., 
2002). Research suggests that metonyms in trademark law can be equated at least roughly with 
descriptive—inherently non-distinctive—word marks that have a contiguous connection with their 
underlying product or service. While perhaps capable of serving as inherent source-identifying 
symbols due to their figurative nature, descriptive marks are thought under trademark law to be 
needed by market competitors, and are thus, at least for this reason, disallowed protection without 
first attaining secondary meaning in the marketplace. See Linford, supra note 10, at 1402 (“Selecting 
a descriptive mark, which is metonymically related to the product identified, or a suggestive mark, 
which is metaphorically related to the product, connects the mark to the product in a manner that will 
readily allow consumers to slip between source-signifying and product-designating meanings.”). This 
Article does not endorse, nor challenge, the initial invalidity of descriptive word marks. For a 
challenge of this nature, see generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First 
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003).  
24. Robert Lake, Metaphor: The Language of the Imagination, 9 J. IMAGINATION LANGUAGE 
LEARNING 125 (2011). 
25. TERENCE HAWKES, METAPHOR 1 (1972). 
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is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another.”26 And, “[n]othing in the fundamental definition of a figure either 
requires a linguistic expression or precludes a visual expression.”27 
Section I.B examines the use of metaphor in advertising and branding. 
Brands rely heavily on both verbal and visual metaphors.28 On a 
conceptual level, metaphors can be used to connect brand and product by 
creating linkages in meaning by mapping across source and target 
domains. More concretely, research in consumer psychology suggests that 
use of metaphor in a word or image mark’s design contributes to its (1) 
vividness, (2) differentiation in the marketplace, and (3) personality—and 
thus, as relevant for trademark law purposes, the mark’s source 
identification function. 
Section I.C. discusses the role of trademarks as trade symbols. 
Trademarks are symbols.29 The sine qua non of a symbol is its figurative 
quality.30 With the exception of fanciful marks, distinctive trademarks 
function as source identifiers by denoting the source, as well as connoting 
qualities, values, or aesthetics of their associated product or service (or 
acquire secondary meaning in the marketplace such that it comes to 
acquire a connotation even lacking such figurative conceptual 
significance).31 In this way, metaphor enables word or image marks to 
                                                     
26. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 5 (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, 
THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE 276 (2007) (“[M]etaphor 
really is a key to explaining thought and language.”); GERALD ZALTMAN & LINDSAY H. ZALTMAN, 
MARKETING METAPHORIA 38 (2008) (“In its earliest form, thought is dependent on metaphorical 
modes.” (quoting GERALD M. EDELMAN, SECOND NATURE: BRAIN SCIENCE AND HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE (2006))). 
27. Edward F. McQuarrie & David G. Mick, Visual Rhetoric in Advertising: Text-Interpretive, 
Experimental, and Reader-Response Analyses, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 37, 39 (1999) (citing E.H. 
GOMBRICH, ART AND ILLUSION: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PICTORIAL REPRESENTATION 
(1960)); see also Linda M. Scott, Images in Advertising: The Need for a Theory of Visual Rhetoric, 
21 J. CONSUMER RES. 252, 264 (1994) (noting that visual figures in advertising in fact have roots in 
art history).  
28. See, e.g., Se-Hoon Jeong, Visual Metaphor in Advertising: Is the Persuasive Effect Attributable 
to Visual Argumentation or Metaphorical Rhetoric?, 14 J. MARKETING COMMS. 59, 60 (2008) (citing 
Pradeep Sopory & James P. Dillard, The Persuasive Effects of Metaphor: A Meta-Analysis, 28 HUM. 
COMM. RES. 382 (2002)). 
29. See, e.g., supra note 11. 
30. See, e.g., supra note 12. 
31. See, e.g., Linford, supra note 19, at 731; Nabil Mzoughi & Samar Abdelhak, The Impact of 
Visual and Verbal Rhetoric in Advertising on Mental Imagery and Recall, 2 INT’L J. BUS. SOC. SCI. 
257, 257 (2011) (explaining that an advertisement is composed of literal (denoted) and symbolic 
(connoted) dimensions and that therefore “creative advertising is based on the transposition of 
rhetorical figures to image advertising” (citing Jacques Durand, Rhétorique et Image Publicitaire, 15 
COMM. 70, 70–95 (1970))). 
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create linkages between a product or service and its source. This allows 
the marks to function effectively as symbols and for consumers to then 
derive inherent meaning from them even at first use. 
A. Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
The traditional definition of metaphor is a figure of speech, where a 
word that literally means one idea or object is used in place of another 
word to suggest a likeness or analogy between the two ideas or objects.32 
Examples of metaphors in this linguistic sense include “drowning in 
money” and “bleeding heart.”33 However, as early as the 1930s, at least 
one scholar noted that “fundamentally [metaphor] is a borrowing between 
and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts. Thought is 
metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language 
derive therefrom.”34 In the 1980s, conceptual metaphor theorists began to 
define metaphor as an essentially cognitive phenomenon that structures 
much of human thought.35 In conceptual metaphor theory, the focus of 
metaphor is no longer on words and language. Instead, it is on 
understanding how one idea or concept can be understood in terms of 
another one, i.e., “A is B.”36 Hence, any form of communication may be 
seen as an instance of metaphor, provided that it induces metaphorical 
thought processes. This view of metaphor as a cognitive—rather than 
linguistic—occurrence also has empirical backing.37 
                                                     
32. See, e.g., Metaphor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 20. This definition can be traced back to 
Aristotle’s Poetics: “[m]etaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus 
to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion.” 
ARISTOTLE, POETICS (S.H. Butcher trans., 1902), http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.mb.txt 
[https://perma.cc/Q6LH-UXVB]. 
33. ARISTOTLE, supra note 32. 
34. I.A. RICHARDS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 94 (1965). 
35. See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14; see also MULTIMODAL METAPHOR 3 
(Charles J. Forceville & Eduardo Urios-Aparisi eds., 1996); Hitchon, supra note 14, at 55; McQuarrie 
& Phillips, supra note 14, at 9 (“[S]ome researchers have hypothesized that metaphor does not occur 
at the surface level of representation (i.e., pictures versus words), but rather at the level of cognitive 
thought.”). 
36. See Robin Coulter & Gerald Zaltman, The Power of Metaphor, in THE WHY OF CONSUMPTION: 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMER MOTIVES, GOALS, AND DESIRES 259, 262 (S. 
Ratneshwar, David Glen Mick & Cynthia Huffman eds., 2000). 
37. See, e.g., Raymond Gibbs & Jennifer O’Brien, Idioms and Mental Imagery: The Metaphorical 
Motivation for Idiomatic Meaning, 36 COGNITION 35 (1990); Matthew S. McGlone & Jennifer L. 
Harding, Back (or Forward?) to the Future: The Role of Perspective in Temporal Language 
Comprehension, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, COGNITION 1211 (1998). 
Indeed, conceptual metaphor theory “has inspired conferences (e.g., those organized by the 
International Cognitive Linguistics Association and the association for Researching and Applying 
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Conceptual metaphors are metaphors where one idea, or conceptual 
domain, is understood in terms of another.38 Metaphor occurs as a 
consequence of the pairing (i.e., connection) of two “domains”—the 
“source” and the “target.”39 The source domain is one that is normally 
familiar whereas the target domain is typically unfamiliar.40 Most often, 
conceptual metaphors result from our natural tendency to conceptualize 
an abstract idea or experience in terms of one that is more concrete, and 
thus more easily understood. Humans typically perceive concrete 
phenomena—what we can see, hear, smell, touch, or taste—as easier to 
make sense of and understand than more abstract phenomena—like the 
concepts of intellectual property or of metaphor, for example.41 
Abstract concepts are often made more concrete by use of metaphor.42 
As examples, consider the abstract concepts of life, emotions, and time. 
Life may be thought of as a journey (“I’m at a crossroads in my life”) or 
a story (“Tell me the story of your life”).43 Emotions may be represented 
in terms of forces (“I was overwhelmed with grief,” or “I was swept off 
my feet”).44 Time may be comprehended as spatial motion (“The time for 
action has arrived” or “Time is flying by”).45 Each of these ideas is so 
embedded in our basic thought processes that it appears natural to us. That 
is, we instinctually and unconsciously move from the concrete source 
domain to the abstract target domain and vice versa. 
The conscious metaphorical expressions—words, phrases, and 
sentences that are the surface realizations of the mappings between the 
target and source domains—may manifest either verbally or visually.46 
However, conceptual metaphor itself originates in unconscious 
cognition.47 The prevailing consensus in the cognitive science and 
                                                     
Metaphor [RaAM]), journals (e.g., Metaphor and Symbol and Cognitive Linguistics), as well as 
empirical research.” See Charles Forceville, Non-verbal and Multimodal Metaphor in a Cognitivist 
Framework: Agendas for Research, in MULTIMODAL METAPHOR 19, 21 (Charles J. Forceville & 
Eduardo Urios-Aparisi eds., 2009). 
38. George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 202, 
206 (Andrew Ortony ed., 1993). 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. See MULTIMODAL METAPHOR, supra note 35, at 1–2. 
42. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 5. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See Coulter & Zaltman, supra note 36, at 259–64. 
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neuroscience fields is that thought is mostly unconscious. Unconscious 
thought tends to be figurative rather than literal, with “metaphors and 
particularly systems of metaphors signal[ing] unconscious evaluations of 
things and processes.”48 Thus, conceptual metaphors are articulated in 
conversation not in raw, figurative form, but as mere metaphorical 
expressions of deeper metaphorical thought.49 
To illustrate, let us consider a common example: the metaphor 
“Argument is War.” Here, the target domain—the concept trying to be 
understood by the metaphor—is “argument.” The source domain—the 
domain from which the relation or understanding is drawn—is the concept 
of “war.” The actual words and language used here are ancillary to the 
mode of thought employed. What matters, on a fundamental level, is the 
way that one concept is mentally conceptualized in terms of another 
concept. Many metaphorical expressions are used to support the 
conceptual metaphor “Argument is War,” including: 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I’ve never won an argument with him. 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out. 
He shot down all of my arguments.50 
These expressions are not considered to be poetic. Instead, they are just 
the basic method we describe when arguing with someone else. Lakoff 
and Johnson explain: 
It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in 
terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the 
person we are arguing with as an opponent. We gain and lose 
ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position 
indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. 
Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by 
the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a 
                                                     
48. Id. at 262. 
49. Id. 
50. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 4. 
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verbal battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, 
counterattack, etc.—reflects this.51 
In conceptual metaphor theory, a “mapping” breaks down the metaphor 
into a series of corresponding phrases that map how the knowledge about 
the source domain is applied to knowledge about the target domain.52 In 
the “argument is war” example, the mappings would include the 
following: (1) participants correspond to soldiers; (2) the discussion 
between participants corresponds to a battle; (3) points made by each 
participant are blows to one another; and (4) each participant’s goal is to 
defend and protect his or her territory.53 These correspondences allow us 
to reason about argument using the same mode of thought that we use to 
reason about war. For instance, the “his argument was right on target” 
expression evokes knowledge about war (dealing a successful blow to an 
opponent) in order to conceptualize and understand how a particular 
analytical point (i.e., battle) affected the overall argument (i.e., war). 
Further, Lakoff and Johnson propose that conceptual schemas are 
shaped by both cognitive and sensorimotor experiences.54 For example, 
the metaphor “Affection Is Warmth” derives as a result of the feeling of 
warmth experienced while being held affectionately.55 Other examples 
include “Knowing Is Seeing,” which comes as a result of our observing 
through our eyes, and “Difficulties Are Burdens,” which derives from our 
experience of having difficulty lifting heavy physical objects.56 Indeed, 
Lakoff and Johnson claim that all of our reasoning about abstract concepts 
has roots in the nature of the body.57 Put another way, the use of metaphor 
often manifests as a result of connecting the external, physical world with 
the inner world of the imagination.58 
B. Verbal and Visual Metaphor in Advertising and Branding 
Given that metaphor is a fundamental thought process, metaphors 
appear not just in language, but also in visuals, sounds, music, gestures, 
                                                     
51. Id. 
52. See Lakoff, supra note 38, at 208. 
53. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 207. 
54. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH 49–54 (1999). 
55. Id. at 50. 
56. Id. at 50, 53–54. 
57. Id. at 53–54. 
58. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 134 (referring to metaphor as “imaginative 
rationality” because it unites imagination and rational thought).  
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and discourse, and have been studied in various media and genres, 
including—most relevantly here—advertising.59 Conceptual metaphors 
are applied in the context of advertising and branding as (1) verbal, (2) 
visual (sometimes referred to as pictorial), or (3) multimodal metaphors.60 
The most traditional are verbal metaphors, which can be defined broadly 
as representing one thing in terms of another through use of an analogy or 
other implicit comparison.61 For example, common terms like “product 
life cycle” and “price war” are verbal metaphors.62 In branding, suggestive 
and other distinctive word marks—e.g., GLASS DOCTOR for glass 
installation and repairs, or GREYHOUND for bus services—are also 
verbal metaphors.63 Yet, advertising and branding relies heavily on visual 
metaphor as well. 
A visual metaphor is commonly defined as a “representation of a 
person, place, thing, or idea by way of a visual image that suggests a 
particular association or point of similarity.”64 Charles Forceville, who has 
analyzed visual metaphor in the context of advertising, defines it as the 
replacement of an expected visual element by an unexpected one, i.e., 
there is no “preexistent or conventional” connection between the two 
elements.65 Art historian E.H. Gombrich and film theorist Noël Carroll 
each describe it as a form of “visual fusion,” where elements from two 
                                                     
59. Charles Forceville, Visual and Multimodal Metaphor in Advertising: Cultural Perspectives, 9 
STYLES COMM. 26, 26 (2017).  
60. See infra notes 61–104 and accompanying discussion. 
61. Charles H. Noble et al., The Effects of Brand Metaphors as Design Innovation: A Test of 
Congruency Hypotheses, 30 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 126 (2013). 
62. Id.  
63. Synergistic Int’l, Inc. v. Windshield Doctor, Inc., No. CV 03-579 FMC (CWx), 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12660, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2003) (finding GLASS DOCTOR to be suggestive and thus 
distinctive due to metaphorical significance). 
64. See, e.g., Noble et al., supra note 61, at 126. However, as one scholar writes, “[t]o understand 
visual metaphor is a difficult task; to explain it is more difficult. For how can one begin to do justice 
verbally to that which is by nature nonverbal and visual?” Hermine Feinstein, Meaning and Visual 
Metaphor, 23 STUD. ART EDUC. 45, 47 (1982). 
65. FORCEVILLE, supra note 14, at 2. For example, in referring to a shoe advertisement displaying 
a male torso with a shoe in place of a tie, he describes visual metaphor (which he calls pictorial 
metaphor) as follows: 
[T]he foregrounded object is a shoe. We immediately see that there is something odd about this 
shoe: it is located in a place where we would not ordinarily have expected it . . . We realize that 
the shoe is depicted in a place where we ordinarily would have expected something else, namely, 
a tie. Put differently, the viewer is invited to understands and perceive the phenomenon SHOE 
not in its usual, ‘literal’ sense, but in terms of the very different phenomenon TIE . . . . The 
metaphor can be verbalized as SHOE IS TIE.  
Id. at 109. 
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separate dimensions are fused into a single bounded entity.66 Most 
broadly, it has been articulated along conceptual metaphor theory lines as 
“any image which is ‘intended to occasion a metaphoric thought.’”67 
A visual metaphor may simply be a color, like green, that is used to 
convey the environmentally friendly nature of an associated product, or a 
combination of colors, for example a red, white, and blue color scheme 
representing the United States.68 Visual metaphors may also be used in 
more complex logos, product packaging, or other visual symbols—such 
as a restaurant’s décor—that convey information or suggest points of 
association or similarity as to a brand. For example, the Apple logo might 
convey, to some consumers at least, the enticing but “iconoclastic” nature 
of the Apple brand by invoking reference to the biblical story of Adam 
and Eve’s fall from grace after consuming an apple—the “forbidden 
fruit”—from the tree of knowledge of good and evil.69 
In the case of a visual metaphor, both the target and source domains are 
depicted pictorially.70 Multimodal metaphors are “metaphors in which 
target, source, and/or mappable features are represented or suggested by 
at least two different sign systems (one of which may be language) or 
modes of perception.”71 Edward McQuarrie and Barbara Phillips, experts 
in the field of metaphor as applied to advertising and branding, explain 
that visual metaphor and multimodal metaphors are generally more 
powerful than verbal ones: 
[T]he more deviant the metaphor, or the greater the discrepancy 
between the unlike things being equated, the more powerful it can 
be in changing meaning. Verbal metaphor suffers by comparison, 
especially when it rests on a single word: put a tiger in your tank, 
as the Esso gasoline ads used to urge. All words are alike, no 
                                                     
66. E.H. GOMBRICH, MEDITATIONS ON A HOBBY HORSE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF 
ART 134 (1971); Noël Carroll, A Note on Film Metaphor, 26 J. PRAGMATICS 809, 812 n.6 (1996) 
(“[I]n visual metaphor the fusion is literal.”). Carroll provides an example from the 1927 Fritz Lang 
film Metropolis, where a machine is transformed into a monster: “[t]he machine, or at least parts of 
it, have been transformed into parts of a monster, Moloch. Nevertheless, the machine is still 
recognizable as a machine. The monster elements and the machine elements are co-present—or 
homospatial—in the same figure.” Id. at 809–10. 
67. Elisabeth El Refaie, Understanding Visual Metaphor: The Example of Newspaper Cartoons, 2 
VISUAL COMM. 75, 81 (2003).  
68. Id.  
69. See MARGARET MARK & CAROL S. PEARSON, THE HERO AND THE OUTLAW: BUILDING 
EXTRAORDINARY BRANDS THROUGH THE POWER OF ARCHETYPES 24 (2001). 
70. Cf. Forceville, supra note 37, at 19, 24. 
71. Charles Forceville, Metaphor in Pictures and Multimodal Representations, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 462, 463 (Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. ed., 2008).  
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matter how distant the concepts they invoke: an arbitrary 
arrangement of phonemes, similar in length, with tens of 
thousands constructed from the same few dozen available 
phonemes. The field of pictures is vastly larger and more varied, 
hence the unlikeness of two objects pictorially juxtaposed can be 
far greater.72 
While conceptual metaphor theory refers to the target domain as 
abstract and the source domain as concrete, that is not always the case in 
the advertising and branding context.73 Instead, the target domain is seen 
to correspond with the product or service being advertised. The source 
domain—conveniently from a semantic standpoint—can be equated with 
the source (i.e., the brand or producer) of the product or service. Products 
or services are frequently depicted in advertising and branding in a 
concrete rather than abstract manner. Thus, the underlying schema is often 
CONCRETE A IS CONCRETE B (rather than Lakoff and Johnson’s 
ABSTRACT A is CONCRETE B).74 For example, a beer may be 
portrayed as a wine to show its sophistication, or an elegant watch is 
represented as a butterfly to allude to its beauty.75 In the trademark 
context, Prudential Insurance’s “Rock of Gibraltar” logo can be seen as a 
concrete visual representation of the abstract concept of stability—
suggesting a characteristic of the brand’s insurance-related services.76 
Regardless of concreteness versus abstraction, the metaphor invites a 
comparison of two objects—the product and the brand—by suggesting 
that they are like one another despite coming from different domains. The 
product is the target,77 while the brand—including its associations, 
imagery, and archetypal significance—is the source.78 
                                                     
72. EDWARD F. MCQUARRIE & BARBARA J. PHILLIPS, VISUAL BRANDING: A RHETORICAL AND 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 179 (2016). 
73. For this reason and others, at least one scholar has argued that the conceptual metaphor 
framework is limiting in the advertising and branding context, and that metaphor can better be seen 
as part of a larger “metaphor scenario” in which consumer interpretations vary. See Forceville, supra 
note 37, at 19, 24. 
74. Forceville, supra note 59, at 26–27. 
75. Id. 
76. See Barbara B. Stern, Figurative Language in Services Advertising: The Nature of Uses of 
Imagery, 15 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 185, 186 (1988). 
77. FORCEVILLE, supra note 14, at 69 (“[I]n the case of advertising th[e] target domain is, or is 
connected to, the product advertised.”). 
78. JAMES GEARY, I IS AN OTHER: THE SECRET LIFE OF METAPHOR AND HOW IT SHAPES THE WAY 
WE SEE THE WORLD 72 (2011) (“An ad is a metaphor in which the product is the target and a set of 
affects—imagery, associations, archetypes—is the source.”). 
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To decipher metaphors in advertising and branding, consumers must 
use “imagination, thought and perception” to draw inferences and find 
similarities between the target and source domains.79 Based on findings in 
cognitive science, this occurs through a core process of cognitive thought 
separable into four mental steps: (1) the relevant terms are accessed from 
long-term memory; (2) the source is mapped to the target to identify 
correspondences; (3) analogical inferences are made about the target, thus 
creating new knowledge; and (4) learning occurs when new links in 
memory are created.80 Gerald Zaltman writes about Budweiser as an 
example: 
When a brand succeeds in establishing a basic association 
(literally, a neural pathway) in consumers’ minds, subsequent 
activations of this association increase the strength of the pathway 
so that an entire neural network eventually forms to reinforce it. 
The beer brewer Anheuser-Busch has repeatedly used the idea of 
connection as its deep metaphor in advertising its Budweiser 
brand over time, so that Budweiser owns that association. 
Consumers’ minds implicitly associate Budweiser and social 
connection. The association hinders other brands from making the 
same association, and when one of Anheuser-Busch’s 
competitors uses social connection, consumers will think of 
Budweiser as well.81 
Use of metaphor has been found to draw consumer attention. 
Specifically, use of metaphor leads to increased (1) “vividness” and (2) 
“brand differentiation,” as well as (3) contributes to a brand’s 
“personality.”82 
First, metaphor has been found to make advertising and branding more 
vivid. Vividness has been defined as “emotionally interesting, concrete 
                                                     
79. See infra Parts II, III. 
80. Barbara J. Phillips & Edward F. McQuarrie, Beyond Visual Metaphor: A New Typology of 
Visual Rhetoric in Advertising, 4 MARKETING THEORY 113, 119 (2004). 
81. ZALTMAN & ZALTMAN, supra note 26, at 126–27. 
82. Noble et al., supra note 61, at 126, 128; see also Katherine L. Spencer, Evaluating Trademark 
Design iv (May 2011) (Master’s Thesis, San Jose State University) (finding that “[t]rademarks with 
high subject-content compatibility and trademarks that use visual metaphor resulted in significantly 
higher comprehension (as measured by ability to match trademark to company description), indicating 
that the graphic design community may want to consider utilizing graphics with high subject-content 
compatibility or visual metaphor if comprehension is determined to be an important focus during the 
trademark design process”).  
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and imagery-provoking.”83 It is the branding corollary to trademark 
distinctiveness.84 A “fundamental goal of brand management is to develop 
a brand that is perceived by consumers as vivid.”85 Vivid information in 
the form of metaphor has been shown to attract consumer attention and 
interest more so than pallid and abstract stimuli.86 For example, use of the 
verbal metaphor “Today’s Slims at a very slim price” will likely engage 
consumers more than the literal statement “Today’s Slims at a very low 
price.”87 In terms of visual metaphor, when Kellogg’s uses its Tony the 
Tiger trademark, “that act of personification invites the consumer to 
transfer meanings from . . . [a] very enthusiastic and youthful cartoon 
tiger to the brand and product.”88 As Rebecca Tushnet notes, vividness is 
helpful in serving trademark law’s information function because “[a] term 
a consumer can’t remember is by definition not doing a good job as an 
indicator of source, and thus, can’t serve the functions we attribute to 
trademarks of protecting consumers from confusion and incentivizing 
producers to keep quality high.”89 
Second, metaphor has been linked to brand differentiation. For 
example, Iron Mountain90 uses its name and logo as a means of expressing 
its superiority in the data and records management business.91 Similar to 
vividness, brand “[d]ifferentiation is an essential element of a brand that 
makes it noticeable in the marketplace and meaningful to consumers.”92 
While vividness involves an isolated assessment of a single brand for 
clarity and strength, differentiation measures a brand in comparison to 
competitors as reference points.93 Branding expert David Aaker has 
                                                     
83. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 869 (citing RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: 
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45 (1980)). 
84. Id. 
85. Noble et al., supra note 61, at 129 (citing R. E. Nisbett and L. Ross, Assessing Weights to Data: 
The “Vividness Criterion,” in HUMAN INTERFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT 42, 42–62 (R. E. Nisbett & L. Ross eds., 1980)). 
86. Id.; see also Feinstein, supra note 64, at 49 (“[M]etaphor, because it is not mediated by the 
verbosity of literal language, is closer to perceived experience. One’s sensory, emotional, and 
cognitive systems are readily engaged, allowing the most relevant experiential information to be 
transferred not only in rich and vivid detail, but in toto.”). 
87. McQuarrie & Mick, supra note 27, at 38–39. 
88. MCQUARRIE & PHILLIPS, supra note 72, at 178. 
89. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 870. 
90. IRON MOUNTAIN, http://www.ironmountain.com/ [https://perma.cc/-XN5D-RCRM. 
91. Noble et al., supra note 61, at 130. 
92. Id.  
93. Id.  
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identified four factors that contribute to the distinctiveness and strength of 
a brand: (1) differentiation, which “[m]easures how distinctive the brand 
is in the marketplace”; (2) relevance, i.e., “whether a brand has personal 
relevance for the respondent”; (3) esteem, which “[m]easures whether a 
brand is held in high regard and considered the best in its class”; and (4) 
knowledge, which is “[a] measure of understanding as to what a brand 
stands for.”94 Yet, Aaker notes that based on a structured survey of over 
13,000 brands in more than thirty countries, “differentiation is the key to 
a strong brand, more so than esteem, relevance, and knowledge.”95 Use of 
metaphor has been found to have a positive influence on brand 
differentiation. Indeed, research “stresses the importance of brand 
metaphors, particularly when used strategically and in combination, in 
order to create differentiated and desirable products in the marketplace.”96 
Third, metaphor has an influence on a brand’s personality. Consumers 
use brands as indicators of source and quality, but also as expressions of 
individuality, self-identity, and self-image.97 Brands thus encompass a 
symbolic, emotional component that appeals to consumers through use of 
metaphor. This subjective, emotional, and aesthetic aspect of brands 
involves “more complex . . . characteristics . . . which are related to 
image building and include status/power, inherent value and finally, the 
development of brand personality.”98 From a psychological perspective, 
brands act as subjective “vehicles for the transfer of meaning from a brand 
to the consumer,” who in turn engages in a process called symbolic 
consumption, using brands as “symbolic resources for the construction 
and maintenance of identity.”99 The metaphorical meaning of brands is in 
                                                     
94. DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 304 (1996) (emphasis added). 
95. DAVID A. AAKER & ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 263 (2000). 
96. Noble et al., supra note 61, at 139; see also Spencer, supra note 82, at 1, 6. 
97. See, e.g., Russell W. Belk & Gulnur Tumbat, The Cult of Macintosh, 8 CONSUMPTION MKTS. 
& CULTURE 205, 210 (2005); Tereza Kuldova, Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation in the Fashion 
Business: Interrogating the Fetishism of the Trademark Law, J. DESIGN HIST. 1, 2 (2016) (noting that 
for Hells Angels “club members, the logos and insignia serve the functions of conserving the club’s 
power, of encouraging membership and support and of reproducing the organization on a daily basis 
through rituals associated with the marks”); John W. Schouten & James H. McAlexander, Subcultures 
of Consumption: An Ethnography of the New Bikers, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 55 (1995) (focusing 
on Harley-Davidson enthusiasts). 
98. BRANDS, COMPETITION, AND IP 79 (Devan Desai et al. eds., 2015).  
99. Veronika Koller, Brand Images: Multimodal Metaphor in Corporate Branding Messages, in 
MULTIMODAL METAPHOR 45, 51 (Charles J. Forceville & Eduardo Urios-Aparisi eds., 2009) (citing 
Majken Schultz, Mary Jo Hatch & Francesco Ciccolella, Brand Life in Symbols and Artifacts: The 
LEGO Company, in ARTIFACTS AND ORGANIZATIONS: BEYOND MERE SYMBOLISM 141, 150 (Anat 
Rafaeli & Michael G. Pratt eds., 2006)). 
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turn perceived by consumers as containing “emotional and self-expressive 
benefits.”100 
According to David Aaker’s brand identity theory, a brand starts with 
a corporate identity, which consumers then interpret as a brand’s image, 
or—metaphorically—as its personality. Personification of a brand means 
“to invoke a metaphor for it.”101 Since the 1980s, companies have sought 
to make their brands more accessible to consumers. To do this, many have 
conceptualized “their brands as living organisms . . . even endowing them 
with a quasi-human ‘personality.’”102 
As an example of brand personality, consider again Kellogg’s use of its 
Tony the Tiger mark in connection with its Frosted Flakes cereal. Cereal 
is nothing like a tiger in the literal sense. However, from a figurative lens, 
personification of the brand as a living thing allows consumers to see it as 
an “emotional partner” rather than “an inert thing.”103 The Kellogg’s 
brand is therefore able to take on the characteristics associated with Tony 
the Tiger—perky, trustworthy, and energetic—and thus the consumer is 
able to relate to the brand as if it were a person.104 
In sum, use of verbal and visual metaphor has been found to increase a 
brand’s vividness, differentiation in the marketplace, and personality. As 
Charles Forceville notes: 
Metaphors’ deviation from conventional usage makes them 
attractive means to draw consumers’ attention. Furthermore, one 
way of realizing the goal of making a claim for his/her product in 
a brief spatial or temporal span is for an advertiser to forge a link 
between the product and something that already possesses the 
characteristic(s) he desires to claim for the product. Now this 
closely echoes what happens in metaphor.105 
                                                     
100. Id. 
101. MCQUARRIE & PHILLIPS, supra note 72, at 178 (“In rhetorical terms, and consistent with a 
long tradition dating back to the Greeks, to personify a brand is to invoke a metaphor for it. More 
exactly, personification initiates a metaphorical transfer of meaning.”). 
102. Koller, supra note 99, at 50. To this end, Jennifer Aaker has developed a theoretical and 
psychological framework of brand personality based on the “Big Five” personality model. Jennifer L. 
Aaker, Dimensions of Brand Personality, 34 J. MARKETING RES. 347, 352–55 (1997). 
103. MCQUARRIE & PHILLIPS, supra note 72, at 178. 
104. Id. 
105. FORCEVILLE, supra note 14, at 69. 
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C. Trade Symbolism 
Trademarks are symbols. In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co.,106 
the United States Supreme Court held that “the requirements for 
qualification of a word or symbol as a trademark are that it be (1) a 
‘symbol,’ (2) ‘use[d] . . . as a mark,’ (3) to identify and distinguish the 
seller’s goods from goods made or sold by others,’ but that it not be 
‘functional.’”107 The Court adopted this reformulation of the Lanham 
Act’s108 definition of “trademark” from J. Thomas McCarthy’s leading 
trademark treatise: 
The requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a 
trademark can be broken down into three elements: (1) the 
tangible symbol: a word, name, symbol or device or any 
combination of these; (2) type of use: actual use in trade of the 
symbol as a mark by a seller of goods or services; (3) the purpose: 
to identify and distinguish the seller’s goods from goods made or 
sold by others.109 
What does it mean for a trademark to be “a symbol”? While the 
definition of symbol varies across disciplines, agreement generally is that 
the sine qua non of a symbol is that it contains not just a literal (i.e., 
denotative) aspect, but also a figurative (i.e., connotative) dimension that 
is expressed through metaphor.110 Consider the following prominent 
examples. Paul Ricoeur, the distinguished philosopher who studied 
phenomenology—the study of consciousness from the subjective, first-
person viewpoint—defined a symbol “as any structure of significance in 
which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in addition, another 
meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative, and which can be 
apprehended only through the first.”111 Carl Jung, the founder of analytical 
psychology—a field of study premised on understanding the meaning of 
the unconscious psyche—views the symbol as “a term, a name, or even a 
picture that may be familiar in daily life, yet that possesses specific 
connotations in addition to its conventional and obvious meaning.”112 
Mythologist Joseph Campbell notes that “a symbol, like everything else, 
                                                     
106. 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
107. Id. (citing 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 3.1). 
108. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
109. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 3.1. 
110. JACOBI, supra note 12, at 77. 
111. Ricoeur, supra note 12, at 12 (emphasis omitted). 
112. JUNG, supra note 1, at 3. 
Marlan – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
790 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:767 
 
 
shows a double aspect. We must distinguish, therefore between the ‘sense’ 
and the ‘meaning’ of the symbol.”113 In sum, a symbol must present both 
an objective, visible meaning and a subjective, hidden meaning as well. 
Symbols are equated with, or are at least highly similar to, conceptual 
metaphors in that both terms involve comparisons where one thing is 
understood in terms of another.114 To this end, Heinrich Zimmer, a 
renowned historian who studied the symbolism of Indian art extensively, 
wrote of the relationship between symbolism and metaphorical thought: 
Concepts and words are symbols, just as visions, rituals and 
images are; so too are the manners and customs of daily life. 
Through all of these a transcendent reality is mirrored. They are 
so many metaphors reflecting and implying something which, 
though thus variously expressed, is ineffable, though thus 
rendered multiform, remains inscrutable.115 
Further, esteemed literary scholars Rene Wellek and Austin Warren 
describe the relationship between symbols, images, and metaphors in their 
seminal Theory of Literature: 
Is there any important sense in which “symbol” differs from 
“image” and “metaphor”? Primarily we think, in the recurrence 
and persistence of the “symbol.” An “image” may be invoked 
once as a metaphor, but if it persistently recurs, both as 
presentation and representation, it becomes a symbol, and may 
even become part of a symbolic (or mythic) system.116 
Trademarks—or trade symbols as they are sometimes called117—are 
part of a symbolic, and perhaps even mythic, system of commerce.118 As 
Barton Beebe has recognized, trademark law functions as a hybrid 
symbolic and economic doctrine that serves to elaborate the principles of 
symbolism in addition to those of the market economy.119 Invoking 
Saussurean semiotics and the work of French philosopher Jean 
                                                     
113. CAMPBELL, supra note 12, at 153. 
114. See, e.g., id. 
115. HEINRICH R. ZIMMER, PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA 1–2 (Joseph Campbell ed., 1951). 
116. RENE WELLEK & AUSTIN WARREN, THEORY OF LITERATURE 193–94 (1949). 
117. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948) (referring to trademark law as the law of trade symbols and 
analyzing their effect, as such, on the public interest); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The 
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (1999) (similarly referring to 
trademarks as “trade symbols” and analyzing trademark law’s effect on the public interest). 
118.  See generally Drescher, supra note 11, at 301–40.  
119. Beebe, supra note 10, at 624; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 124–25. 
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Baudrillard,120 Beebe theorizes that the “triadic structure” of the 
trademark consists of three elements: (1) the “signifier,” or tangible 
symbol “conveying into the mind something from without”; (2) the 
“referent,” “which can be a physical ‘object of the world’ or a mental 
entity “of the nature of thought or of a sign”; and (3) the “signified,” which 
constitutes the “proper significant effect . . . of the sign.”121 Under this 
semiotic theory, these elements are each one corner of the “semiotic 
triangle” that corresponds with trademark law’s “requirements for 
qualification of a mark or symbol as a [distinctive] trademark.”122 
This triadic structure model corresponds to the three elements of a 
trademark articulated by McCarthy and embraced by the Supreme Court 
in Qualitex. The first element—the tangible symbol—corresponds with 
the signifier as each refers to “the perceptible form of the mark.”123 The 
second element—the type of use—corresponds with the referent in that it 
is needed to connect the marked goods and services (via the consumer’s 
imagination) with the tangible signifier.124 Finally, the third element—the 
function of the mark—is associated with the signified, meaning (in the 
trademark context) the specific source of the goods or services.125 As an 
example, the mark NIKE consists of a signifier (the mark NIKE), a 
signified (Nike, Inc., the entity, or alternatively one of its brands), and the 
referent (the goods—athletic wear).126 
To function as a symbol, a trademark must therefore operate on both 
literal and figurative levels so as to designate source as well as reveal 
information about a product or service.127 Metaphor, by operating across 
two conceptual domains, mentally invokes both the signified and the 
referent. It thus can be seen to allow the trademark, as the signifier, to 
“mediate” between the signified (i.e., the source) and the referent (i.e., the 
product or service).128 In this way, the trademark, as analogous to the 
                                                     
120. See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES (Chris 
Turner trans., 1998) (1970) (critiquing the symbolic meaning of consumption and mass media in 
modern culture); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Faria Glaser trans., 
1988) (examining the increasingly tenuous connection between symbols and reality). 
121. Beebe, supra note 10, at 636, 646. 
122. Id. at 645. 
123. Id. at 646. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 654. 
127. Linford, supra note 19, at 737–38. 
128. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastics Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1994); Beebe, 
supra note 10, at 653. 
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signifier, “is understood to function as the hinge within the sign”—the 
sign consisting of the commodity itself.129 The trademark operates within 
a symbolic system by identifying and distinguishing the source of a good 
or service and the identification of this source in turn identifies and 
distinguishes a good or service itself.130 Use of metaphor is particularly 
important in trademark law today given that the source of goods or 
services is often anonymous. 
Indeed, trademark distinctiveness today is defined as the “tendency to 
identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, 
though possibly anonymous, source.”131 This “anonymous source 
doctrine” holds that a mark must represent a single source, but consumers 
do not need to know its actual origin. The anonymous source doctrine is 
a departure from early trademark law in that it serves to link the concept 
of “source” with a particular product or brand rather than its specific 
origin.132 Thus, modern trademark law sees the mark itself, not the 
producer, as “a repository for meaning.”133 In this regard, Beebe writes: 
Even if consumers cannot identify precisely what factory or 
company a trademark refers, still, consumers will assume that a 
specific instance of a trademark is referring to the same source as 
are other instances of the trademark. This “anonymous source” 
will receive trademark protection. The tendency of consumers to 
construct an anonymous source, a model, from which is produced 
specific instances of a commodity, is not limited to conventional 
word or image marks, however. In the case of mass-produced 
commodities, consumers will also construct such a source for 
[trade dress].134 
                                                     
129. Beebe, supra note 10, at 653. 
130. Id.  
131. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imp. & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis 
added); see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 15:8 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter 2 MCCARTHY] (explaining that to establish secondary meaning, a 
plaintiff needs to show “that the ordinary buyer of these goods or services associates the designation 
with a single, albeit anonymous, source”).  
132. See Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 
467 (2005); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and 
Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2005). 
133. Heymann, supra note 132, at 1422; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 
EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999); Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 360 (2008). 
134. Beebe, supra note 10, at 663. 
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The concept of source in trademark law is therefore often nothing but 
a legal fiction that equates to brand. For instance, the producer Altria 
Group, Inc. (formerly Phillip Morris Companies Inc.) sells wine under its 
Chateau Ste. Michelle brand and cigarettes under its Marlboro brand.135 
Yet, trademark law does not require that the mark owner use the Altria 
designation for either.136 To illustrate this point, consider the analogy of a 
writer who is free to write under a pseudonym.137 Indeed, as trademark 
luminary Frank Schechter pointed out almost a century ago, “[t]he modern 
manufacturer may use a mark or several marks or no mark just as he 
pleases.”138 
In this way, the anonymous source doctrine permits mark owners to 
choose a symbolic brand identity to be associated with each product or 
service offered.139 As a result, marks often suggest qualities, values, or 
atmospherics relating to their corresponding products or services. The 
mark thus does not merely symbolize the underlying goodwill of a 
specific producer as it used to. Instead, it creates goodwill in and of 
itself.140 Because consumers are aware of the mark and not necessarily the 
actual producer, the trade symbol must be distinctive (i.e., conceptually 
separate) vis-à-vis its underlying product or service.141 
Using trademarks to link product and brand (rather than product to 
producer) allows for a level of creativity that was absent during the age 
where marks merely served to identify the producer.142 While creativity 
was formerly of little relevance, it is today required to establish the link 
between consumers and brands that mark owners want consumers to 
experience. As Irina Manta notes, trademarks now “must be linked . . . to 
                                                     
135. Who We Are, ALTRIA, http://www.altria.com/Careers/Who_We_Are/Altria_Family_ 
Companies/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3S6A-L8LQ]. 
136. Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 441 (2011). 
137. For example, J.K. Rowling, the author of the Harry Potter book series, has written under the 
name Robert Galbraith so as not to reveal to readers her true identity. See generally, e.g., ROBERT 
GALBRAITH, THE CUCKOO’S CALLING (2013). 
138. FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-
MARKS 122 (1925). 
139. Heymann, supra note 132, at 1379.  
140. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
319, 360 (2008) (citing Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813, 815 (1927)) (“[T]oday, the trademark is not merely the symbol of good will but often the 
most effective agent for the creation of good will, imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous 
and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions. The mark actually 
sells the goods.”). 
141. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastics, Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1994). 
142. Irina D. Manta, Branded, 69 S.M.U. L. REV. 713, 715 (2016). 
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the underlying good to imprint it on the consumer’s mind. Establishing 
this link is also an undertaking in creativity.”143 
Such a creative link is one that often results from establishing a 
metaphorical connection between the mark and its product or service.144 
Laura Heymann explains that “the concept of metaphor is fundamental to 
how most [protectable] trademarks work.”145 Indeed, the vast majority of 
trademarks operate on a figurative level “in that they require consumers 
to use a familiar word or expression in a new and initially unfamiliar 
context.”146 For example, the mark BRAWNY for paper towels is 
designed to serve as a literal product name, but also to associate the brand, 
figuratively and symbolically, with human strength. Heymann writes: 
[A] trademark works because it causes consumers to think of a 
particular lexical unit as a proper name in addition to whatever 
literal meaning the word holds. The lexical unit “camel” 
engenders no metaphorical associations when it is used in 
connection with the desert animal; the same word used in 
connection with cigarettes operates on an additional “dimension 
of meaning.”147 
Thus, the inherent distinctiveness of word marks can be seen to depend 
simply on whether a mark operates on a strictly literal level as the name 
of a product or service, or on a metaphorical one as a term creatively 
linking a brand with its underlying product or service. However, as Part 
II explains, trademark law’s inherent distinctiveness doctrine provides a 
somewhat more nuanced inquiry. 
II. VERBAL METAPHOR AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF 
WORD MARKS 
This Part explains that trademark law currently uses metaphor as its 
doctrinal trigger for deciding the inherent distinctiveness of word marks. 
Section II.A examines the inherent distinctiveness doctrine. It reviews the 
Abercrombie spectrum as a “hierarchy of figurativeness.” In doing so, it 
                                                     
143. Id. at 727. 
144. Heymann, A Name I Call Myself, supra note 10, at 603 (“[T]he inherent strength of a mark 
(and therefore whether it gets protection ab initio or requires additional evidence) depends on how 
creative the mark is. The mark might be a commonplace and dull description of the good’s qualities 
or characteristics (and therefore might need to be used by others), or use metaphor to suggest a good’s 
characteristics, or create a new meaning for an existing word.”). 
145. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, supra note 10, at 1330. 
146. Id. at 1330–31. 
147. Id. at 1331–32. 
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notes that the binary, yes-no judgment for trademark validity differs from 
the tiered, scope-based evaluation of trademark strength.148 Section II.B 
explains that trademark law’s primary test for determining the validity of 
word marks, the “imagination” test, is implicitly a test of metaphorical 
thought in that it seeks a figurative connection between a mark and its 
associated product or service.149 The inherent distinctiveness of a word 
mark thus often hinges on the use of a verbal metaphor. Section II.C 
discusses other tests for inherent distinctiveness, though each lacks the 
conceptual significance that the imagination test—in testing for the 
symbolic connotation of a mark—carries. 
A. The Abercrombie Spectrum 
Judge Friendly, in his influential 1976 Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision, Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,150 developed 
what is known today as the Abercrombie spectrum.151 Put simply, it is a 
“hierarchy of figurativeness.”152 Under this framework, word marks are 
divided into five categories, from least to most protectable: (1) generic, 
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) fanciful.153 The 
spectrum is used to determine both a mark’s “eligibility to trademark 
status”—its inherent distinctiveness, or validity—and “the degree of 
                                                     
148. Beebe, supra note 10, at 670.  
149. Id. 
150. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
151. See generally id. 
152. Beebe, supra note 10, at 670. Similarly, Jake Linford finds that categories of semantic shift 
correspond with the various classifications of word marks posited by the Abercrombie spectrum. 
Linford, supra note 10, at 1406–08. With certain exceptions, Linford equates fanciful marks—words 
coined for use as marks and not derived from preexisting words—with monosemes: words having 
only one meaning. Id. at 1406. Arbitrary marks—derived from a preexisting word allegedly having 
no connection with the product or service sold—are comparable to homonyms: words having no 
connection between an existing meaning and a new brand-related meaning. Id. at 1407. Suggestive 
marks—preexisting words requiring an “imaginative leap” between the mark and the product are 
metaphors: marks establishing a figurative connection between the existing meaning of the word and 
its new trademark-related meaning. Id. at 1408. Descriptive marks—preexisting terms directly 
describing a feature of an equated product or service—are roughly comparable to metonyms: terms 
having a contiguous connection between an already existing meaning and a new sense such as a part 
for a whole (e.g., “suit” used to describe a corporate employee). Id. Finally, generic marks are words 
restricted from trademark protection that are used to describe general categories or members of a 
specific category. Id. at 1404. 
153. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. For a thorough scholarly review of the Abercrombie spectrum’s 
categories, see also Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. 
REV. 1095, 1102–21 (2003).  
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protection accorded” it—the mark’s conceptual strength, or scope.154 A 
determination of inherent distinctiveness involves a yes-no, binary 
judgment separate from the tiered, hierarchical evaluation of mark 
strength.155 A mark is inherently distinctive when, at the time it is first 
used, “[its] intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.”156 Mark 
strength, on the other hand, is a matter of degree.157 Rather than its 
validity, the strength of a mark is used to determine the degree of 
protection a mark is afforded compared to other confusingly similar or 
diluting marks.158 
On one end of the Abercrombie spectrum sit generic marks, which 
define a class of things (e.g., BOOK STORE for a book store, BOTTLED 
WATER for bottled water, or LITE BEER for light beer).159 Generic 
marks can never serve as protectable trademarks under the theory that they 
are unable to identify the source of a product or service.160 Generic marks 
denote (rather than connote) the product or service, and do not denote the 
source at all. 
Next, descriptive marks convey an immediate idea of the ingredients, 
qualities, or characteristics of a related product or service (e.g., 
AMERICAN AIRLINES for a U.S.-based airline, ENTREPRENEUR for 
a business-oriented magazine, or SALTY for anchovies).161 Descriptive 
marks are protectable only upon a showing of acquired distinctiveness—
commonly referred to as secondary meaning in the marketplace, i.e., when 
                                                     
154. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.  
155. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 
2028 (2005) (equating “source distinctiveness” with what “a trademark must possess to fall within 
the subject matter of trademark protection,” and “differential distinctiveness” with trademark 
strength, “the extent of which prescribes the scope of trademark protection when protection is given”); 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 351, 353 
(2014) (“Whether a mark passes the distinctiveness threshold for validity is a binary yes-no question, 
but evaluating the strength of a mark—a critical issue in trademark infringement suits—requires 
evaluation of the degree of distinctiveness.” (citing Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (explaining that the 
Abercrombie spectrum reflects two discrete inquiries: “eligibility to trademark status” and “the degree 
of protection accorded”))).  
156. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000).  
157. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. 
158. See id.  
159. See id. (“A generic term is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the 
genus of which the particular product is a species.”). 
160. See id. The prohibition on trademarking generic names is a longstanding one. See Canal Co. 
v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (“Nor can a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article 
of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a trademark and the exclusive 
use of it be entitled to legal protection.”). 
161. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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the mark becomes sufficiently distinctive so as to establish “a mental 
association in the buyers’ minds between the alleged mark and a single 
source of the product.”162 Descriptive marks are metonymical rather than 
metaphorical—they typically have a literal or contiguous connection as to 
their marked product or service.163 
Nearing the center of the spectrum, suggestive marks are “textbook 
metaphors and are described as such by the doctrine.”164 That is, they 
require “imagination, thought and perception” to reach a conclusion as to 
the nature of their associated products or services (e.g., KLONDIKE for 
ice cream, ROACH MOTEL for roach traps, or GREYHOUND for a bus 
service).165 Unlike their descriptive brethren, suggestive marks are 
immediately protectable upon first use and without a showing of 
secondary meaning.166 
Next on the spectrum are arbitrary marks. Arbitrary marks are also 
protectable absent secondary meaning but are considered to be 
conceptually stronger than suggestive marks. While arbitrary marks have 
meaning in the everyday sense, that meaning bears no obvious, concrete 
connection to their associated product or service (e.g., NIKE for footwear, 
CAMEL for cigarettes, or APPLE for computers).167 But, while not often 
recognized as such, arbitrary marks are also usually metaphorical. In 
evoking values or aesthetics associated with a product or service, they are 
catachrestic metaphors.168 Catachrestic metaphors are metaphors used in 
a way that departs from conventional or traditional use.169 The catachrestic 
metaphor differs from a typical figurative expression in that there is no 
                                                     
162. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 131, § 15:5; see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 
455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996) (defining secondary meaning as existing when “in the minds of the public, 
the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather 
than the product itself” (quoting Dayton Progress Corp. v. Lane Punch Corp., 917 F.2d 836, 839 (4th 
Cir. 1990))).  
163. See Linford, supra note 10, at 1369. 
164. Beebe, supra note 10, at 671. 
165. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 131, § 11:67; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (2015) [hereinafter TMEP]. 
166. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 131, § 11:67; TMEP, supra note 165, § 1209.01(a). 
167. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
168. Compare Beebe, supra note 10, at 671 (noting that in the case of “arbitrary marks such as 
APPLE for computers or SHELL for gasoline, the figurative relation is not so much metaphorical as 
it is catachrestic”), with ALAN SINGER, A METAPHORICS OF FICTION (1984) (defining “catachrestic 
metaphor” as “a trope that strayed beyond the field of contextual determinations warranting its usage” 
(emphasis added)).  
169. ANSHUMAN SHARMA, THE IMPACT—THE ART OF COMMUNICATING ELOQUENTLY 78 (2014). 
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semantic connection between the term and its referent. Rather, it is a 
metaphorical form chosen for its rhetorical color and effect.170 
Finally, on the far end of the spectrum, fanciful marks are often 
considered to be the strongest marks because, under the theory of 
linguistic arbitrariness, their only linguistic function is to identify the 
source of the products or services with which they are associated (e.g., 
PEPSI for a soft drink, XEROX for document services, or KODAK for 
imaging products).171 Yet research finds that many so-called fanciful 
marks employ sound symbolism—i.e., a direct linkage between sound and 
meaning—and thus too have a sort of metaphorical connection to their 
underlying products and services.172 Jake Linford notes that studies of 
sound symbolism call into question the assumption that fanciful marks 
have no inherent meaning.173 If individual syllables of words convey 
meaning, the owner of a fanciful mark may be communicating product 
qualities to consumers, just as do descriptive or suggestive marks.174 For 
example, a seemingly “nonsense” word like SWIFFER may lack a 
definition in the dictionary, yet its component sounds may connote speed 
and ease of use. Research shows that brands purposefully use sound 
symbolism when choosing new trademarks.175 
Thus, inherently distinctive word marks—suggestive, arbitrary, and 
even many fanciful designations—are metaphorical in that they contain 
both denotative (literal) and connotative (figurative) dimensions of 
meaning. As Thomas Bell summarizes, 
At root, the Abercrombie scale measures the metaphorical 
distance between the “sense” of a mark or trade dress and its 
“reference.” The sense of a symbol lies somewhere between the 
wholly subjective impressions that it arouses in each observer and 
the objective, external thing to which it refers. Thus, “morning 
star” has a different sense from “evening star” even though both 
                                                     
170. See Hugh C. White, Metaphor as Performative, in READING COMMUNITIES READING 
SCRIPTURE 66, 79–81 (Gary A. Phillips & Nicole Wilkinson Duran eds., 2002). 
171. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995) (noting that arbitrary 
and fanciful marks are assumed to “almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand”). 
But see generally Linford, supra note 19 (explaining that, contrary to the theory of linguistic 
arbitrariness, many or most fanciful marks rely on sound symbolism—a link between sound and word 
meaning—and thus connote product qualities like other categories of trademarks). 
172. See generally Linford, supra note 19.  
173. See id. 
174. See id.  
175. See id. at 730–32 (citing Richard R. Klink, Creating Brand Names with Meaning: The Use of 
Sound Symbolism, 11 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2000)). 
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names refer to the same object: Venus. This abstract notion casts 
new light on the Abercrombie scale.176 
Within the Abercrombie spectrum, though, there exists a dichotomy 
between suggestiveness and descriptiveness that tends to be where 
arguments—battles—are fought in both the transactional law and 
litigation settings. The next section explains that the predominant test for 
inherent distinctiveness, the imagination test, tests for metaphorical 
significance as a binary threshold matter of validity, separate and apart 
from the sliding scale of trademark strength. 
B. The Imagination Test 
As just discussed, when evaluating a word mark’s validity, trademark 
law uses the Abercrombie spectrum to decide whether a mark is “merely 
descriptive,” and thus not eligible for trademark protection absent 
secondary meaning, or if it is suggestive and thus inherently distinctive 
and entitled to immediate protection at first use in commerce.177 At least 
one commentator has referred to this dividing line as the “suggestive-
descriptive dichotomy.”178 Courts use an “imagination” test as the 
“primary criterion” in making this determination.179 According to the 
imagination test, a word mark is suggestive—and thus inherently 
distinctive rather than merely descriptive—if it requires “imagination, 
thought and perception” for consumers to reach a conclusion as to the 
nature of its corresponding product or service.180 Less often, courts will 
also use the imagination test in deciding whether a word is arbitrary or 
fanciful.181 At a high level, “if the mark imparts information directly, it is 
descriptive. If it stands for an idea which requires some operation of the 
imagination to connect it with the goods, it is suggestive.”182 Yet, what 
the test seeks more precisely is a figure of speech—a metaphorical 
expression that denotes the brand and connotes qualities or values 
                                                     
176. Tom W. Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very Real Problem, 56 MD. L. REV. 384, 412 (1997). 
177. See, e.g., Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
178. See Linford, supra note 10, at 1374. 
179. Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 903 (9th Cir. 
1995)); see also Roberts, supra note 10, at 1057 (“The test used most often to determine whether a 
mark is merely descriptive, i.e. goods-constative, is known as the imagination test.”). 
180. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 131, § 11:67; TMEP, supra note 165, § 1209.01(a). 
181. See, e.g., ToHo Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
182. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976) (quoting ARTHUR 
H. SEIDEL, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE 77 (1963)). 
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associated with a product or service. In the terms of conceptual metaphor 
theory, a metaphorical mapping from the source (i.e., brand) to the target 
(i.e., product or service) domains is required. 
Deciding whether a trademark is descriptive (i.e., initially invalid) or 
suggestive (i.e., valid immediately) is an important endeavor. In the 
litigation setting, proving that a plaintiff’s mark is descriptive without it 
having established secondary meaning often spells victory for a 
defendant, whereas a showing that it is suggestive entitles the mark to 
protection and thus allows a trademark infringement or other cause of 
action to move forward.183 In the transactional context, the suggestiveness 
determination is instrumental in deciding whether a particular mark is 
cleared for use as a brand.184 Indeed, the act of acquiring secondary 
meaning in the marketplace is time-consuming (often taking five years or 
longer), expensive, and difficult to prove.185 Thus, the suggestive-
descriptive dichotomy is a frequent point of contention in trademark law. 
The imagination test is a test of metaphorical significance. It requires 
an “imaginative leap” to connect the mark with the product.186 The 
                                                     
183. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1584 (2006) (finding that plaintiff win rates usually correspond 
with a mark’s conceptual strength in accordance with their Abercrombie spectrum classification); 
Linford, supra note 10, at 1379 (remarking that “significant consequences turn on the suggestive-
descriptive determination”). 
184. Specifically, issues of distinctiveness come up in four different ways: first, when an applicant 
files an application to register a mark with the PTO, the trademark examiner analyzes whether the 
mark is distinctive, merely descriptive, or generic; second, during an opposition proceeding (if a third 
party opposes a trademark application) or a petition to cancel (if a third party seeks to cancel an 
already issued registration); third, if a mark owner sues for infringement of a registered mark, the 
defendant may claim that the registered mark is not distinctive and thus unprotectable—barring a 
ruling of incontestability which is used to prevent a challenge as to distinctiveness; fourth, if an 
unregistered mark owner sues in federal court under Lanham Act section 43(a)(1)(A), the mark owner 
must establish distinctiveness or the claim will typically be dismissed. See MARK JANIS, TRADEMARK 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION IN A NUTSHELL, 19–20 (2013).  
185. TMEP, supra note 165, § 1212 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012)); see also Heymann, supra 
note 136, at 389 (“Indeed, it would not be surprising to learn that the marketing department and the 
legal department in a typical company find themselves frequently at odds—the legal department 
recommending more fanciful names so as to acquire trademark protection more easily, and the 
marketing department desiring a more descriptive name that efficiently conveys to consumers the 
product’s qualities without the need to spend millions of advertising dollars in consumer education.”).  
186. To explain the imagination test, the examples of the marks ROACH MOTEL for a roach trap, 
and ENTREPRENEUR for a business-focused magazine, are illustrative. ENTREPRENEUR as used 
in connection with a business magazine is descriptive because consumers understand the term to refer 
in literal fashion to the business focus of the magazine. No imagination is required in making that 
connection. In comparison, consumers who see or hear the term ROACH MOTEL would think of a 
roach-infested motel room. They would not immediately jump to the realization that the product is a 
roach trap. Thus, unlike ENTREPRENEUR, ROACH MOTEL does not describe the product’s 
08 - Marlan(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
2018] VISUAL METAPHOR AND DISTINCTIVENESS 801 
 
 
“imagination” needed to link a suggestive word mark with its 
corresponding product or service “refers to the mental process required to 
connect a name that is incongruous or figurative with the product (e.g., 
‘Roach Motel’ with an insect trap or ‘TIDE’ with soap).”187 The 
imagination test—not unlike the Abercrombie spectrum generally188—has 
endured its fair share of criticism. Judge Learned Hand wrote that “[i]t is 
quite impossible to get any rule out of the cases beyond this: That the 
validity of the mark ends where suggestion ends and description 
begins.”189 Others have since referred to the test, metaphorically, as 
“shadowy,”190 “murky,”191 and “not always clear.”192 
But those who understand that what the imagination test seeks is 
metaphorical thought are better able to utilize and appreciate its depth. 
One court has articulated the imagination test in an especially 
complementary and eloquent manner: 
[Suggestive word marks] generally do not, unlike the merely 
descriptive phrase, direct the consumer immediately to the 
producer by way of road signs that prominently advertise the 
goods. Instead, the journey to the market source leads them 
through an intermediate loop at the cloverleaf in thought. Where 
the descriptive common words lead the buyer by the hand, the 
rarer suggestive mark ushers through the mind. From the 
commercial name to the product or its market to its source, the 
suggestive term transports both through purposefully evocative 
words laden with intimation and through the contemplated 
imagery and associations the name conjures. That passage is 
                                                     
features metonymically; it instead hints at and suggests them metaphorically. See Entrepreneur Media, 
Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 
589 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1978).  
187. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing G. 
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1491 n.46 (E.D. Wis. 1987)). 
188. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of 
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1035 (2009) (criticizing the test’s effect on 
trademark law); Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act—Its Impact Over Four Decades, 
76 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 220 (1986) (calling the Abercrombie spectrum “artificial and regrettable” 
and “[o]ne of the worst blights [on trademark law] . . . which has spread from the Second Circuit into 
others and now appears to be settling in generally”); Tushnet, supra note 4, at 865 (describing the 
Abercrombie spectrum test’s negative impacts on trademark law). 
189. Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 
1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d. Cir. 1925). 
190. See Brown, supra note 117, at 1188. 
191. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design 
Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 519 (1997). 
192. See Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
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neither linear nor strait. It demands a mental exercise, multiple 
bounds in a dual act of perception and imagination. A first stage 
is associated with the creative energy exerted by the maker of the 
mark. When choosing what to call the article, the creator of the 
suggestive name meaningfully fixes upon associational terms that 
will identify the product figuratively and will appeal to the 
consumer by allusion and metaphor. The second mental act closes 
that loop. It is that which occurs in the mind of the consumer 
allured to the product, and who may accept it in part on the 
strength of the purposeful imagery summoned by its 
name . . . . [S]uggestiveness is an artful quality of inherent 
imagery and obliqueness infused into a fine turn of a word or 
phrase which, at the moment of perception when it all clicks and 
the association intended becomes apparent, stirs the response 
often with admiration. “That’s it.” It is, for example, the 
roundabout recognition evoked by calling a computer clicker a 
“mouse,” or conceiving of the name “Big Star” to mark a small 
town in Bethlehem.193 
C. Alternative Tests for Determining Inherent Distinctiveness 
While the imagination test is the primary criterion for deciding 
distinctiveness, courts do sometimes consider other tests in making 
validity determinations either in combination with or instead of the 
imagination test. These include (1) the “competitors’ need” test, and (2) 
the “dictionary” test.194 
The competitors’ need test “focuses on the extent to which a mark is 
actually needed by market competitors to identify their goods and 
services.”195 If a trademark conveys information about goods or services 
that is “so direct and clear that competing sellers would be likely to need 
to use the term in describing their goods in advertising and promotion,” 
then it is merely descriptive.196 From an economic perspective, granting 
exclusive rights to use of generic marks has long been thought to give 
                                                     
193. BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(emphasis added).  
194. For a comprehensive list of tests used by courts to measure distinctiveness, see Roberts, supra 
note 10, at 1056–76 (2012) (explaining that tests for distinctiveness include imagination, double 
entendre, incongruity, creative fallacy, dictionary, competitors’ need, competitors’ use, puffing, and 
intentional fallacy).   
195. See Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 1987).  
196. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 131, § 11:68. 
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trademark owners a monopoly and thus hinder competition.197 This logic 
provides the basis for the competitors’ need test.198 
The dictionary test is at times used by courts and the Patent and 
Trademark Office along with, or instead of, the imagination test.199 The 
test looks at the common usage of the term or terms comprising a mark 
for evidence of the mark’s non-distinctiveness. If the word mark is used 
as, or as part of, the dictionary definition of the word at issue, it is typically 
considered descriptive rather than suggestive. Evidence that a mark is 
merely descriptive may be obtained from sources such as dictionaries, 
surveys, or newspapers.200 The dictionary test is essentially an inversion 
of the imagination test in that it tests for mere descriptiveness (concretely, 
by use of a dictionary or similar source) instead of inherent distinctiveness 
(abstractly, via metaphor and the consumer imagination). 
In sum, while alternative tests do exist, the inherent distinctiveness and 
thus initial validity of word marks most often hinges on establishing a 
metaphorical connection with their underlying product or service. Word 
marks that have no metaphorical significance either because they are 
literal designations (generic marks) or metonymical representations 
(descriptive marks) are ineligible for initial trademark status. Word marks 
that are metaphorical, though, are deemed eligible for all of the benefits 
of trademark protection ab initio. This is consistent with the figurative 
quality of a symbol, and, as previously discussed in Part I, being a 
“symbol” is the first requirement of a valid trademark. 
                                                     
197. For example, granting a trademark for the word BANANA to a company selling bananas 
would force competitors to label their products as something else, which would perhaps raise 
transaction costs. Cf. Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting Generic Trademarks, 17 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 110, 145–47 (2015) (arguing that competition can also be hindered when 
trademark doctrine fails to recognize a generic term that has acquired distinctiveness).  
198. A similar test is the “third party’s actual use” test. Instead of looking prospectively, this test 
seeks to determine whether third parties have actually used to the term to describe the qualities of 
their own products or services. If so, the term is likely to be deemed merely descriptive. 
199. See, e.g., Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1979); Xtreme Caged 
Combat v. ECC Fitness, No. 12–CV–3855, 2013 WL 6022135, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2013). 
200. For example, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found the word COACH to be, 
[M]erely descriptive when used in connection with educational materials used to prepare 
students for standardized tests because it “immediately conveys to purchasers the purpose of the 
materials.” In support of this finding, the Board pointed to the dictionary definitions of the word 
“coach,” which include: (1) “a private tutor who prepares a student for an examination”; . . . and 
(3) “to give instruction or advice in the capacity of a coach; instruct.” 
Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1378 (2012) (citing Coach Servs., Inc. 
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600, 1617 (T.T.A.B. 2010)). 
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III. VISUAL METAPHOR AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF 
IMAGE MARKS 
Though the inherent distinctiveness of word marks often turns on the 
use of metaphor, that figurative framework is all but abandoned in the 
context of image marks. There is no consistent, uniform, and predictable 
test for deciding the inherent distinctiveness of image marks in the form 
of logos and trade dress. Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office often 
use the Seabrook test, which is a multi-factor inquiry designed to ascertain 
whether an image mark is “commonplace” or unique in the field.201 In 
other decisions, the Abercrombie spectrum is applied, often haphazardly, 
in the case of images.202 Yet, only rarely does trademark law apply the 
imagination test in the image context. 
The lack of clarity surrounding the determination of image 
distinctiveness is unsurprising given the conclusory treatment of images 
under the law more generally.203 Rebecca Tushnet explains that “images 
have a complex relationship to truth, reality, and deception, especially in 
the law. Western culture associates images with truth, but also with 
emotion, and, therefore, with dangerous subjectivity.”204 And Elizabeth 
Porter notes that the law lacks tools to deal sufficiently with images: “‘I 
know it when I see it’ is not merely an aphorism: It’s the reigning, if not 
sole, canon of visual interpretation under the law.”205 
This Part attempts to make the case that in circumstances where the 
inherent validity of an image mark is at issue, trademark law would do 
well to look to whether the image in question206 contains a visual 
metaphor, i.e., that it is able to convey one or more positive features or 
                                                     
201. See infra section III.B. 
202. See infra section III.B. 
203. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 8, at 1696. And, as J. Thomas McCarthy, author of the leading—
and usually otherwise very helpful—treatise, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, puts it: 
Because a picture is worth a thousand words, there is little in the way of guidelines to determine 
the visual similarity which will cause a likelihood of confusion with buyers. Obviously, for 
picture and design marks (as opposed to word marks), similarity of appearance is controlling. 
There is no point in launching into a long analysis of the judicial pros and cons regarding visual 
similarity of marks. Regarding visual similarity, all one can say is “I know it when I see it.” 
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 23.25. 
204. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 862. 
205. Porter, supra note 8, at 1696. 
206. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will focus on logo mark examples. However, given the 
broad definition of conceptual metaphor as “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms of another,” LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 5, there is no principled reason why other 
forms of trade dress—or even more unusual marks like scents, sounds, or motion—cannot be 
understood in terms of metaphorical associations. 
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connotations relating to its associated product or service. Section III.A 
provides a description of the categories of image marks that are, under 
current law, eligible for trademark protection without secondary 
meaning—logos, product packaging, and services-related trade dress. 
Section III.B reviews the most prominent tests for deciding the inherent 
distinctiveness of image marks—the Seabrook test and the Abercrombie 
spectrum’s hierarchy of word mark strength—and concludes that they are 
at times ineffective. Section III.C proposes, in taking into account the 
research presented in the previous Parts of this Article, a definitional test 
of visual metaphor. According to the test proposed, the distinctiveness of 
an image mark would be based, at least in part, on whether the mark 
includes (1) the representation of a person, place, thing or idea, (2) by 
means of a visual image, (3) that suggests an obvious particular 
association or point of similarity as to its underlying product or service.207 
Such a framework is conceptually coherent with the trademark’s status as 
a symbol and would mirror the predictability inherent in the word mark 
distinctiveness context. 
A. Image Marks: Logos and Trade Dress 
The Lanham Act’s definition of a trademark “includes any word, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the 
goods, even if that source is unknown.”208 This definition makes clear that 
almost any symbol, including a visual image, capable of consumer 
perception may potentially function as a trademark. The simplest type of 
image mark is a logo or design mark. Consider the common examples 
mentioned in the Introduction: Starbucks’s siren logo, Nike’s swoosh, and 
the Apple logo. As a matter of law, logos, like word marks, may be 
inherently distinctive. But, the method for evaluating such validity 
remains less than clear. 
More complex still is the issue of trade dress.209 Trade dress has in the 
past been defined as the overall appearance of labels, wrappers, and 
                                                     
207. See infra section III.C. 
208. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
209. For a scholarly analysis of distinctiveness and trade dress as set against the backdrop of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area, see generally Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving 
Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 243. 
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containers used as product packaging.210 Over time, that definition has 
broadened to include any elements that are used in the presentation of a 
good or service to a consumer.211 This includes elements used to identify 
the source of the goods or services associated with a trade dress, such as 
size, shape, color(s), textures, and graphics used on both the product and 
the packaging of the product.212 Like other types of marks, trade dress 
must be distinctive to be protectable.213 Consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, trade dress may be categorized into three basic areas: (1) 
product packaging, (2) product design, and (3) what Justice Antonin 
Scalia described as “tertium quid”—services-oriented and experiential 
trade dress like a restaurant’s distinctive décor.214 For example, one court 
recognized trade dress protections in “the distinct building designs and 
interior and exterior color schemes” of Dunkin’ Donuts stores.215 
Some carve-outs to trade dress protection exist for conceptual and 
policy reasons. First, if trade dress is purely—or largely—“decorative” or 
“ornamental” (rather than source-indicating), it is not eligible for 
protection under the Lanham Act.216 Examples of trade dress found to be 
“merely decorative” are designs on sweaters, arrangements of gems on 
rings, and means of displaying produce in grocery stores. Second, trade 
dress protection is generally not available for product design or product 
packaging that is “functional” to the product.217 The rationale being that 
trade dress protection extended to the functional elements of a product 
could deprive consumers of the opportunity to purchase competing 
products, and marketplace competitors of the chance to create alternative 
product versions. 
Certain types of trade dress may be inherently distinctive, whereas 
other types are only protectable upon a showing of secondary meaning. 
The Supreme Court has commented on the distinctiveness of trade dress 
in three cases: Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,218 Qualitex Co. v. 
                                                     
210. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
211. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 8:1. 
212. Id. 
213. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992). 
214. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000). 
215. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Restaurants LLC v. D&D Donuts, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 
1362 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
216. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 8:1 n.17. 
217. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001). 
218. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
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Jacobsen Products Co., and Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros.219 In Two 
Pesos, having found no textual basis in the Lanham Act for treating trade 
dress differently than word marks or logos, the Court held that product 
packaging and similar trade dress can be inherently distinctive and thus 
registrable absent secondary meaning.220 In Qualitex, the Court held that 
a single color or a combination of colors could be a form of distinctive 
trade dress, but only after first acquiring secondary meaning.221 Lastly, in 
Wal-Mart Stores, the Court carved out product design as a discrete 
category of trade dress incapable of protection without secondary 
meaning.222 Roughly, the Court’s rationale was that the purpose of product 
design is so often functional instead of source-identifying.223 Protection 
of product design from the outset would thus impair competition and 
make it difficult for new competing businesses to form. 
In sum, logos, product packaging (minus color alone), and experiential 
trade dress—like the décor of a restaurant—remain eligible for protection 
upon a showing of inherent distinctiveness. Colors and product designs, 
though, must first acquire secondary meaning in commerce, and are 
therefore not considered as candidates for a visual metaphor-based test of 
inherent distinctiveness. 
B. Current Tests for Determining the Inherent Distinctiveness of 
Image Marks Are Insufficient 
Trademark law has no uniform test for evaluating the inherent 
distinctiveness of image marks. Most often, courts, the Patent and 
Trademark Office, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board use a test 
derived from Seabrook Foods v. Bar-well Foods224—the “Seabrook” 
test.225 Others use the Abercrombie spectrum without recognizing its 
figurative significance. Some courts use elements from both tests, while 
others use neither. 
The most prominent test for evaluating the distinctiveness of image 
marks is the Seabrook test. Seabrook involved the appearance of product 
packaging trade dress, yet is now used in cases involving both logos and 
                                                     
219. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
220. See 505 U.S. at 772. 
221. See 514 U.S. at 519. 
222. See 529 U.S. at 214. 
223. See id.  
224. 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  
225. Id. at 1345.  
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various forms of trade dress. Under the Seabrook test, courts will consider 
the following factors: 
[1] [W]hether [the logo or trade dress] was a “common” basic 
shape or design, [2] whether it is unique or unusual in a particular 
field, [3] whether it was a mere refinement of a commonly-
adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular 
class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation 
for the goods, or [4] whether it was capable of creating a 
commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words.226 
The Seabrook test does not refer to the symbolic dimensions of the 
mark at issue. Instead, the test factors amount to “variations on a theme 
rather than discrete inquiries,” each of which is used to ascertain whether 
an image mark is “commonplace.”227 For example, the Fifth Circuit 
applied the Seabrook test in Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini 
Storage228 in connection with a logo in the form of a “[s]tar [s]ymbol” 
used in connection with moving and storage services.229 Here, the mark at 
issue was stylized—shaded and set within a circle—and had been 
registered with the Patent and Trademark Office.230 Nonetheless, the Fifth 
Circuit held that these attributes did not sufficiently distinguish it from 
other star-formative logos.231 The court thus held that the mark was not 
inherently distinctive, i.e., that it was not so “unique, unusual or 
unexpected” in the market that consumers would perceive it as identifying 
of source.232 As evidence for its judgment, the Fifth Circuit cited 
McCarthy’s Trademarks and Unfair Competition treatise for the 
proposition that Abercrombie is typically ill-suited for application to 
images.233 The Court also cited a Restatement of Trademarks comment 
addressing symbols and graphic designs: 
A symbol or graphic design is not inherently distinctive unless the 
nature of the designation and the manner of its use make it likely 
                                                     
226. Id. at 1344. 
227. See Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 244 (5th Cir. 2010).  
228. 608 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2010). 
229. See id. at 240.  
230. See id. at 245. 
231. See id. at 246–47. 
232. See id. at 247. 
233. See id. at 241 (citing 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 131, § 11:7 (“Use of the spectrum of 
descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful is largely confined to word marks. It is usually not 
suitable for nonword designations such as shapes and images . . . [, which] must be judged by other 
guidelines.”)). 
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that prospective purchasers will perceive the designation as an 
indication of source. Commonplace symbols and designs are not 
inherently distinctive since their appearance on numerous 
products makes it unlikely that consumers will view them as 
distinctive of the goods or services of a particular seller. Thus, 
unless the symbol or design is striking, unusual, or otherwise 
likely to differentiate the products of a particular producer, the 
designation is not inherently distinctive.234 
One issue with deciding whether a “symbol or design is striking, 
unusual, or otherwise likely to differentiate the products of a particular 
producer” is that it is entirely subjective and does not establish anything 
close to a bright-line rule.235 For instance, Lars Smith notes that the 
Seabrook test “puts the court in the position of having to make quasi 
artistic or design decisions, unrelated to the real issue of whether [the 
image] is functioning as a source identifier.”236 The test also conflates 
validity with scope of protection. Indeed, word marks often are 
protectable even if they are commonplace, provided that they are used in 
connection with goods and services dissimilar to other uses of the same 
or similar mark. Here, the star symbol was in use by numerous third-
parties such as Wal-Mart and the Dallas Cowboys professional football 
team. Yet, those uses are outside of the moving and storage field, making 
consumer confusion unlikely. In fact, commonplace basic shapes—like a 
star—may be unusual in a particular field. And, coupled with their strong 
figurative connotations, commonplace images may therefore be powerful 
inherent source identifiers. Thus, the main inquiry under Seabrook—
whether an image is “commonplace”—has certain merit but is not always 
sufficient in assessing the validity of image marks. 
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court noted 
(perhaps in dicta) that Abercrombie is directly applicable to evaluating the 
inherent distinctiveness of trade dress, yet provided no guidance on how 
to actually apply it.237 Courts are split as to whether to use Abercrombie 
for image marks. For instance, the Fifth Circuit in Amazing Spaces noted 
that the star symbol “resists categorization under the Abercrombie test.”238 
                                                     
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
235. Id. 
236. See Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress 
Conundrum, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 243, 299–300. 
237. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
238. Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 240 (5th Cir. 2010).  
Marlan – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
810 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:767 
 
 
It was unwilling, though, “to hold that the Abercrombie test is eclipsed 
every time a mark other than a word is at issue.”239 
When courts do apply Abercrombie to images—which occurs in a 
minority of the cases—they nearly always apply its degree-based 
hierarchy of strength (generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and 
fanciful categories) rather than its binary judgment of validity by use of 
the imagination test. The result of this misapplication is that courts end up 
concluding that many logos and nearly all forms of trade dress—having 
nothing concrete and literal to do with the product or service—are 
“arbitrary,” and thus highly distinctive. When it comes to product 
packaging especially, the possibilities are virtually limitless and courts are 
quick to assume anything not resembling the product to be arbitrary.240 
This potentially results in a wide scope of protection for many image 
marks, which can be seen as undesirable from a competition-oriented 
standpoint, and perhaps at odds with whether consumers actually perceive 
the trade dress to be inherently distinctive.241 
As a result, Abercrombie is not typically the exclusive test used to 
determine the inherent distinctiveness of images. In several cases, 
Seabrook is used as a supplement to Abercrombie (or vice versa) because 
a rote application of Abercrombie typically results in most images being 
classified as arbitrary. Yet, this perceived problem is the result of an 
incorrect interpretation of Abercrombie. In analogizing to word marks, the 
arbitrary classification is not truly arbitrary in the linguistic sense, i.e., 
having no meaningful semantic connection to the product or service. 
Instead, arbitrary marks, as noted in Part II, are generally catachrestic 
metaphors.242 Thus, there is no literal connection between the signified 
(brand) and its referent (the product or service) in the case of an arbitrary 
                                                     
239. Id. at 243. 
240. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 
1993) (“Since the choices that a producer has for packaging its products are, as the Fifth Circuit noted, 
almost unlimited, typically a trade dress will be arbitrary or fanciful and thus inherently 
distinctive . . . .” (citing Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 697 
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982))). Note, however, that a recent empirical study 
suggests we may be running out of attractive word marks, and if that is true, one could imagine that 
we might also be running out of attractive trade dress elements. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and 
Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 950 (2018). 
241. See, e.g., Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress After Two Pesos, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 408, 410 
(1994). 
242. See supra Part II; infra note 254 and accompanying discussion. 
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mark. Notably, though, there is typically a figurative connection between 
the two. 
For example, Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega243 involved a dispute over 
a manufacturer’s purported use of several Greek organizations’ word 
marks and crest logos.244 One issue involved the inherent distinctiveness 
of these fraternity and sorority crest logos. Here, the court applied both 
the Abercrombie and Seabrook tests to each organization’s unique crest.245 
The crests consisted of several symbols, including: 
x A harp for Alpha Chi Omega; 
x A lion’s head for Alpha Delta Pi; 
x A crescent moon and sickle for Alpha Gamma Rho; 
x A sheaf of wheat and a rose for Alpha Omicron Pi; 
x A cross for Alpha Tau Omega; 
x A gryphon and shield for Beta Theta Pi; 
x A cross and crescent moon for Lambda Chi Alpha; 
x A twelve-pointed star for Chi Phi; 
x A snake for Sigma Kappa; and 
x An anchor with a shield for Delta Gamma.246 
Under Abercrombie, the court believed each image to be “arbitrary”: 
[A]ll of the Greek Organizations’ symbols consist of shapes or 
figures that have nothing to do with their status as fraternities or 
sororities. An image of a sheaf of wheat, knights’ helmet, or arrow 
do nothing to signify a characteristic or quality of a fraternity or 
sorority organization. Therefore . . . the Greek Organizations’ 
various symbols . . . cannot be given a classification of “generic” 
because they do not “connote the basic nature of articles or 
services” of fraternity or sorority organizations in general. 
Furthermore, the various symbols do not “identify a characteristic 
or quality” of fraternity or sorority organizations; therefore, a 
“descriptive” classification would also be inappropriate. 
Additionally, the various symbols do not “suggest an attribute” of 
fraternity or sorority organizations; therefore, a suggestive 
classification would also not be appropriate.247 
                                                     
243. 781 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 
244. See id. 
245. See id. at 411–12. 
246. See id. at 413. 
247. Id. at 414. 
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Given the so-called arbitrary status of the marks, the district court next 
turned to the Seabrook test to determine whether the marks were entitled 
to protection under the inherent distinctiveness doctrine. It reasoned: 
[T]he Court shall evaluate the symbols under both the 
Abercrombie and Seabrook Foods tests. If the Court were to use 
the Abercrombie test, as promoted by the parties, it appears here 
that the symbols themselves are entitled to an “arbitrary” 
classification. The various symbols, such as a sheaf of wheat, 
arrow, knight’s helmet, lion’s head, rose, or cross, among others, 
have no relation at all to a fraternity or sorority organization. The 
use of such figures in association with these organizations that are 
in no way associated with the subject matter of the figures entitles 
these marks to an arbitrary classification.248 
Applying Seabrook, the court held that the symbols were likewise 
inherently distinctive in that they could not be classified as “common.” 
According to the court: 
While the symbols themselves largely are based upon commonly-
known shapes or figures such as a rose, cross, or owl, they often 
have their own unique elements within their design; the arrow of 
Pi Beta Phi, for example, has a handle along its bottom, and the 
cross used by Sigma Chi has curved edges, unlike most crosses. 
Furthermore, one cannot say that these marks are commonly used 
amongst fraternity and sorority organizations; indeed, each Greek 
Organization has unique features by which it seeks to create a 
unique identity . . . . [A]mong the relevant base of 
customers . . . members of the Greek Organizations and their 
families, it is clear that the symbols are inherently 
distinctive . . . . To these customers, it is clear that they would 
recognize these symbols as by their intrinsic nature serving to 
identify a particular source because they are members of the 
Greek Organizations that they have designed them or adopted 
them as a symbol.249 
While the district court ultimately came to the right result—the logos 
were inherently distinctive—they did so only after applying multiple tests, 
and the reasoning they used was thin. The court claimed that the various 
symbols “do not ‘identify a characteristic or quality’ of fraternity or 
sorority organizations,” when in fact they do.250 For instance, Chi 
                                                     
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 415–16.  
250. Id. 
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Omega’s crest contains “the owl, a bird of wisdom, which reminds the 
membership of their responsibility to strive for knowledge and 
understanding throughout life.”251 Alpha Omicron Pi’s golden sheaf of 
wheat “represents individuals bound together by ties of friendship and 
made stronger together than they are apart.”252 And, Lambda Chi Alpha’s 
crescent is meant to signify “eternity, purity, fertility and growth, and 
submission to divine law.”253 The images on the crests were not picked 
arbitrarily by the fraternity or sorority; each was picked to represent the 
core ideals embodied by the organization.254 Thus, each image can be said 
to require an imaginative leap on behalf of the consumer. Instead, 
invoking Seabrook, the court emphasized the design and artistic qualities 
of each symbol, like the handle of the Pi Beta Phi arrow and the curved 
edges of the Sigma Chi cross, rather than their underlying meanings. This 
rationale is a stretch, though, as some shapes—e.g., the Lambda Chi 
Alpha cross and crescent—are very basic. 
Based on the research presented in Parts I and II of this Article, 
Abercrombie is perhaps a closer proxy for the distinctiveness of image 
marks than is Seabrook. However, when trademark law imports 
Abercrombie in the image context, it might better test for a metaphorical 
relationship between the mark and its product or service as a threshold 
matter, without rigidly applying Abercrombie’s scope-based strength 
inquiry. 
Yet, trademark law only rarely applies the imagination test to non-
verbal marks.255 At least one court has applied the imagination test to a 
composite mark, though. There, the logo consisted “of a stylized line 
                                                     
251. History, CHI OMEGA FRATERNITY, http://chiomega.com/about-us/the-history-of-chi-omega/ 
[https://perma.cc/25A3-LFKV]. 
252. Facts and Information, ALPHA OMICRON PI, https://www.alphaomicronpi.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/SBU8-W6KZ]. 
253. Emblems of the Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, ALPHA CHI LAMBA CORNELL, 
https://www.iswza.org/ideals/emblems [https://perma.cc/C2S4-V57A]. 
254. Arbitrary marks are usually chosen for rhetorical color and are a deliberate misuse of a term. 
Consider NIKE—classified as arbitrary under the Abercrombie spectrum. Consumers link the brand 
to the ideals of strength, victory, and ability. This connection from the brand to the athletic wear 
product is not arbitrary, but instead metaphorical. See Nike, Inc. v. Leslie, No. 85-960-Civ-T-15, 1985 
WL 5251, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1985). The Nike swoosh, too, is a visual metaphor (though in its 
simplicity perhaps not an obvious one). It is designed to perhaps represent one wing of Nike, the 
Goddess of Victory. This connotation contrasts with, for example, the metonymic NBA logo, 
depicting a basketball player and thus a part to a whole rather than an understanding of one thing in 
terms of another.  
255. See, e.g., Schiappa v. CharityUSA.com, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75771 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 
2017) (finding an image mark consisting of a paw print shaped like a heart to be suggestive because 
it takes a leap of the imagination to go from a heart-shaped paw print to love of animals). 
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drawing on the back of an envelope, with a black keyhole design on the 
back flap of the envelope and the word ‘POSTX’ appearing below the 
flap.”256 The district court found that the logo did not literally describe the 
product. Instead, it functioned as a metaphor: 
The court finds that plaintiff’s mark is suggestive. The drawing 
itself, an envelope containing a keyhole, suggests a concept of 
safe mail, though tying the design to plaintiff’s product requires 
some imagination. The word “POSTX” appearing on the 
envelope drawing is also is [sic] suggestive of mail delivery, 
requiring, again, a certain degree of imagination to link it to the 
plaintiff’s email product. An envelope bearing a keyhole and the 
word “POSTX” does not literally describe plaintiff’s product, it 
suggests it by analogy and thereby requires that the viewer use 
some imagination.257 
The Ninth Circuit then explained that the mark was suggestive and thus 
“moderately strong based on the design of the mark and the product it 
represents.”258 However, more fundamental to the mark’s protectability 
than its scope of protection is the binary distinctiveness threshold 
established by the mark’s metaphorical significance. 
C. Proposal: An Imagination Test of Visual Metaphor 
In light of the aforementioned, this section proposes that trademark law 
would do well to look to the metaphorical significance of an image or 
composite mark when evaluating its inherent distinctiveness, i.e., the 
mark’s initial validity as demonstrated by its conceptual, symbolic 
significance. Given that trademark law already does this in its evaluation 
of word mark distinctiveness, implementing such a test in the context of 
image marks, while challenging, should not be insurmountable. This 
proposed test places the burden on the mark owner—in cases where the 
distinctiveness of an image mark is not obvious—to provide an 
explanation of the metaphorical quality of the mark in mapping from the 
brand to the product. In other words, the imagination, thought, and 
perception necessary to connect the mark with its corresponding goods or 
services. 
In the trademark prosecution setting, this explanation, by the mark 
applicant or its attorney correspondent, would be the equivalent of 
                                                     
256. See PostX Corp. v. docSpace Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
257. Id. at 1060–61. 
258. Id. at 1061. 
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overcoming a genericness or descriptiveness refusal issued by the Patent 
and Trademark Office for word marks.259 That is, trademark examiners 
could, if uncertain of the metaphorical quality of the image, issue an 
objection in the form of an Office Action to the trademark applicant for 
lack of distinctiveness. In response to the objection, the applicant would 
need to describe the figurative significance of the mark, i.e., that it both 
denotes source and connotes its related product or service. In the litigation 
context, if the validity of a mark is in dispute, both parties could provide 
arguments as to the image mark’s metaphorical qualities or lack thereof. 
Notably, this proposal utilizes Abercrombie’s imagination test, but 
does not rely dogmatically on its hierarchical classifications—generic, 
descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful.260 Other than the 
descriptive-suggestive dichotomy, the classifications are not needed for a 
threshold determination of the validity of images, just as they are not 
necessary to the yes-no validity judgment in the word mark context. While 
“[t]he strength of a given mark rests on its distinctiveness,”261 the reverse 
is not true. The threshold showing of distinctiveness is binary. The 
suggestive-descriptive dichotomy centers only on whether a figurative 
connection exists between the mark and its corresponding product. 
Thus, trademark law could use the imagination test as a binary measure 
of the inherent distinctiveness of images—removed from Abercrombie’s 
hierarchical, scope-based inquiry. As discussed in section II.C, the 
imagination test looks for the figurative, metaphorical nature of a mark, 
and thus the symbolic requirement of a valid trademark. If there is a 
metaphorical connection between an image and its marked product or 
service, then the image should be seen (at least from a conceptual lens) as 
inherently distinctive. In other words, its connotation is inherent by virtue 
of its symbolism, instead of having to be acquired through secondary 
meaning in the marketplace. 
However, there may be reasons to restrict the protection of image 
marks even if they function in a metaphorical sense. For instance, consider 
the image of a heart-shaped candy box. It has inherent figurative 
significance but is so common as to perhaps be considered generic.262 The 
                                                     
259. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2012); TMEP, supra note 165, § 1209. 
260. See supra section II.B. 
261. Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. Am. Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988).  
262. Author’s Comment on “Aesthetic Functionality,” in 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:81 (5th ed. 2017) (“A heart-shaped candy box is such a standard, oft-used 
shape as to be a ‘generic’ shape, incapable of trade dress status and certainly incapable of ever 
achieving a secondary meaning.”). 
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proposed test of visual metaphor need not function as an exclusive test for 
the inherent distinctiveness of images—just as the imagination test does 
not function as the exclusive test for word marks. Other tests are 
sometimes employed in tandem with it, like the competitor’s need test or 
the dictionary test.263 But, from a conceptual lens, the imagination test 
serves as an important “first cut” in satisfying the requirement that a valid 
trademark be “a symbol.” 
At a high level, the author suggests only that trademark law would do 
well to look to whether a particular visual mark is capable of connotative 
significance in relation to its underlying product or service in cases when 
its inherent validity is at issue. This specific proposal—which should be 
seen as a preliminary possibility and begs future research—utilizes 
metaphor-in-advertising theorist Charles Forceville’s criteria for 
interpreting visual metaphors in advertising.264 As previously mentioned, 
most metaphors in commercial advertising use the product or service (or 
the brand more broadly) as the metaphor’s target domain. This is coupled 
with the “something else” that serves as the source domain, which in the 
trademark context is represented by the mark itself. The mark’s meaning 
can thus be mapped onto the target domain (the product or service). 
Forceville suggests several elements to be analyzed in determining 
whether a visual metaphor exists in a given advertisement. First, Lakoff 
and Johnson’s definition of metaphor as “understanding and experiencing 
one kind of thing in terms of another” makes clear that the first criterion 
for interpreting something as a visual metaphor is that two “things” are 
involved.265 Thus, two things must be identified: (1) the product or service 
(i.e., the target) and (2) the “something else” connoted by the mark that is 
separate from the product or service (i.e., the source). Second, once it is 
determined that two “things” exist, it must be determined which is the 
target and which is the source.266 Because the target domain typically 
constitutes the product or service, we can look to the goods or services 
being used with the mark (perhaps identified by the federal trademark 
application, if one exists). Once the target domain is identified, the next 
step is identifying the source domain. This might be accomplished, in the 
trademark context, by looking at the image mark itself. Is the source 
                                                     
263. See supra section II.C. 
264. See, e.g., FORCEVILLE, supra note 14, at 4; Forceville, supra note 59, at 26.  
265. These two things are not reversible—a metaphor is considered TARGET IS SOURCE, and, 
in a given context, the two domains cannot be reversed. For example, ARGUMENT IS WAR is not 
the same metaphor as WAR IS ARGUMENT. 
266. See supra notes 277–85. 
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domain—the image—“something else” as compared to the product? Or is 
it a literal (generic) or metonymical (descriptive) representation of the 
product itself? The final stage of visual metaphor interpretation involves 
“deciding which positive feature(s) or connotation(s) is/are to be mapped 
from source onto target (i.e., product).”267 
Not all consumers need “to map the same features—for advertisers the 
attractiveness of using visual/pictorial metaphors presumably resides in a 
degree of ‘customization’ for individual viewers, who are after all aware 
they are invited to map positive connotations”268 from the marks to the 
product or service. And, in mirroring the suggestive versus arbitrary mark 
distinction, appropriate mappable features include “emotions, attitudes, 
and beliefs no less than more fact-oriented associations.”269 Thus, in 
deciding whether a mark utilizes visual metaphor (and therefore 
imagination, thought, and perception on the part of the consumer), three 
factors might include the following identified by Forceville: (1) what are 
the two dimensions of the metaphor?; (2) which is the target and which is 
the source?; and (3) what are the probable intended features to be mapped 
from source to target?270 
Below are some thoughts as to how Forceville’s thoughts might be 
implemented as an imagination test for image marks. This proposal 
recommends separating a commonly used definition of visual metaphor—
“the representation of a person, place thing, or idea by means of a visual 
image that suggests a particular association or point of similarity”271—
into elements, as is common among legal tests, so that each can be 
supported or attacked individually. Moreover, it adds to the end of the 
definition a trademark-related qualifier, “as to its underlying product or 
service.” This additional language references the need for “mapping” 
from source (brand) to target (product or service) domains discussed in 
Part I. 
                                                     
267. See generally Forceville, supra note 59. 
268. Id. 
269. Id.  
270. Id. 
271. See, e.g., Lenora Ledwon, Understanding Visual Metaphors: What Graphic Novels Can 
Teach Lawyers About Visual Storytelling, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 193 (2015); Richard Nordquist, Visual 
Metaphor, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/visual-metaphor-1692595 [https://perma.cc/ 
T5J6-RTNK]. 
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As illustrations, let us once more return to the examples presented in 
the Introduction: (1) the Apple logo,272 (2) Starbucks’s siren,273 and (3) 
                                                     
272.  
   
Apple, Inc., Apple Logo, 1998; Tiziano Vecellio, The Fall of Man, 1550. 
273.  
 
Starbucks Corp., Starbucks Logo, 2011; Audio2Visual Contest, A Siren’s Call: A Little Bit Closer, 
Contest Image, 2014, https://www.flickr.com/photos/rinoa_cathcart [https://perma.cc/BV7Q-8ZLT]. 
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Nike’s swoosh.274 For the sake of brevity, these examples focus on logo 
marks, but there may also be potential application of visual metaphor in 
the trade dress context given the metaphorical significance of product 
packaging and even services-related décor. As should perhaps be obvious, 
it is not implied that the examples that follow are the actual metaphorical 
connotations intended by these brands or perceived by all consumers. 
They are intended, rather, to show that some image marks are more 
capable of connotative significance than others. 
1. The Representation of a Person, Place, Thing, or Idea 
This first factor indicates that the image mark must be a clear 
representation of a person, place, thing, or idea to be subject to the test. It 
refers to the mark’s denotative aspect. This factor alludes to the source 
domain—the mark itself as representative of a producer or, more often, a 
brand.275 What it seeks is a definable representation that can be used in 
commerce. The Apple logo is quite clearly a representation of an apple, 
and the Starbucks siren represents a mermaid, and each would meet this 
factor of the test. The Nike swoosh—while now famous as representative 
of the wing of the Goddess Nike, is less concretely a “person, place, thing, 
or idea,” and therefore in its abstraction means that an imagination test—
typically used to determine the boundary between descriptive and 
suggestive marks—is unnecessary to deem it inherently distinctive. 
Again, what is important is that the mark consist of a concrete, obvious—
i.e., easily perceived or understood—person, place, thing, or idea. This 
                                                     
274.  
  
Nike, Inc., Nike Logo, 1995; Nike, Goddess of Victory, 500 B.C.E. 
275. See supra section II.A. 
Marlan – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  8:50 PM 
820 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:767 
 
 
establishes the need for the second and third factors. If the mark is not a 
concrete representation, it is per se inherently distinctive as a fanciful 
image mark. 
2. By Means of a Visual Image 
The second proposed factor requires that an inherently distinctive 
image mark contain a visual image separate from its wording or other non-
visual elements. It largely tracks Seabrook’s fourth factor—that the image 
must create its own commercial impression apart from other verbal or 
non-verbal elements of the mark.276 This factor is helpful because an 
“image” may be classified in multiple ways; it is not limited to visual 
matters. First, imagery may refer to the basic “representation through 
language of sense experience.”277 In this sense, it is not limited to purely 
visual matters. Second, an image can exist as a figure of speech—a verbal 
metaphor where the image refers to “something else.”278 In fact, “it is at 
this point that image and symbol begin to merge.”279 Finally, a third 
category of images “emphasizes the capacity of an image to embody a 
symbolic division.”280 
Because the definition of “image” is subject to multiple interpretations, 
this factor requires that image is interpreted narrowly to refer to a pictorial 
design containing a visual dimension. In the case of composite marks, the 
visual part of the mark must—without the assistance of the verbal 
portion—satisfy factors one and three of this test. Each of the prior factors 
meets this definition of image. The Apple logo is entirely a visual 
illustration of an apple (with a bite out of it). The swoosh is a rough sketch 
of the Goddess Nike’s wing, and the Starbucks logo is a visual 
representation of a siren/mermaid. All three examples, in being entirely 
visual representations, would thus meet this second factor. Marks which 
are not images in this narrow sense are excluded from the test of visual 
metaphor. 
                                                     
276. See supra note 225 and accompanying discussion.  
277. L. L. DICKSON, THE MODERN ALLEGORIES OF WILLIAM GOLDING 10 (1990). 
278. See id.  
279. Id.  
280. Id.  
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3. That Suggests a Particular Association or Point of Similarity as to 
Its Underlying Goods or Services 
The final factor requires that an image be able to connote its underlying 
product or service. In conceptual metaphor theory terminology, it requires 
conceptual mapping from the brand to the product. Consistent with the 
economic and psychological dimensions of trade symbols discussed in 
Part I, the image must therefore refer to qualities, values, or aesthetics 
relating to its marked product or service. Further, the inherently distinctive 
image mark cannot be metonymical. For example, if an image mark is for 
restaurant services, it could not be a utensil-formative logo. An inherently 
distinctive image mark associated with a coffee shop cannot be a coffee 
mug. If there are both metaphorical and metonymical parts to an image 
mark, it perhaps makes sense for the law to “disclaim” the metonymical 
aspects of the mark, thereby only allowing trademark protection for the 
metaphorical ones. Thus, in addition to being both a concrete and a visual 
representation, the image mark, as indicative of the source domain, must 
visually suggest—rather than describe—characteristics of its target 
domain. The Apple logo and Starbucks’s siren would each satisfy this 
final factor. 
Apple’s logo mark, an apple with a bite out of it, has several possible 
connotations. In this regard, Forceville writes, 
The word “apple” has as its denotation APPLE, (i.e., the concept 
“apple”) and among its possible connotations, say, “being a fairly 
ordinary kind of fruit,” “keeping you healthy”, “being tasty”, 
“being the fruit with which the serpent seduced Eve, and Eve in 
turn seduced Adam”, “being the fruit of which Paris had to 
present a golden specimen to one of the goddesses Hera, Athena 
or Aphrodite, by his decision indirectly causing the Trojan War”, 
etc. Similarly, a picture of an apple has the denotation APPLE and 
the same range of potential connotations as the word “apple”. 
This latter message of the picture is . . . its “connoted” or 
“symbolic” message.281 
Different consumers may conceive of different connotations for the Apple 
logo. What is important is that consumers see the Apple logo as connoting 
something apart from its computer and technology-related goods and 
services. 
Likewise, Starbucks’s logo—a mermaid, or siren, with long, spiraling 
locks of hair—could be said to invoke the archetype of the explorer and 
                                                     
281. CHARLES FORCEVILLE, ADVERTISING METAPHORS 72 (1996). 
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the theme of the sea.282 In myth, sirens have long been associated with 
luring sailors in with enchanting songs, and Starbucks similarly lures 
consumers in with the promise of a hot beverage and a recess from the 
daily grind.283 Starbucks’s trade dress is likewise metaphorical. Its 
prominent green color evokes natural, ecological imagery, while its in-
store décor combines wood and metal piping which contributes to its 
“voyaging ship” theme.284 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the figurative connection must 
be plausible. Many other figurative interpretations of the brands and 
products and services mentioned are possible. What is important is that a 
plausible—i.e., fair or reasonable—metaphorical connection is 
established, whether or not the exact connotations differ from consumer 
to consumer. The particular connotations are subjective, but the 
definitional test of visual metaphor is designed to create an objective 
measure of symbolic significance—like the imagination test in requiring 
a (any) clear “imaginative leap” on the part of consumers. In any case, in 
considering the way mark owners and consumers make symbolic 
meaning, trademark law would do well to consider more heavily the role 
of conceptual metaphor as a component, even if not a threshold 
requirement, in determining trademark distinctiveness, regardless of the 
type of mark at issue. 
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
Having examined how a test of visual metaphor might be implemented 
in trademark law, this Part briefly discusses three potential objections to 
such a test. These include (1) the abstract nature of the concept of 
metaphor, (2) criticisms of the Abercrombie spectrum and the imagination 
test in the word mark context, and (3) that the test would serve to 
incentivize symbolic consumption and therefore contribute to the dilution 
of culture through the commodification of numinous imagery. 
A. Abstraction 
At first blush, applying a test of visual metaphor may seem like an 
unworkable idea. The concept of metaphor is quite abstract, with the basic 
conceptual metaphor definition laid out in this Article as being the 
understanding of one thing or concept in terms of another. Yet, the 
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proposal just laid breaks the definition of visual metaphor into constituent 
parts. As discussed in section I.B, there is further an entire literature to fall 
back on that relates conceptual metaphor theory and similar theories to the 
branding context. The rules of trademark law—in filtering through 
millions of consumers’ subject mindsets—are bound to be amorphous.285 
Yet, the test presented, even given its potential subjectivity, would likely 
be an improvement over the current judgments of commonality under 
Seabrook, or the confusion stemming from attempting to fit images into 
Abercrombie’s categorical framework in a literal, scope-based sense. As 
a binary judgment, the majority of cases seeking visual metaphor should 
be fairly obvious. Of course, at the margins there will be close calls, which 
is not unlike other doctrines in trademark law which likewise revolve 
around the consumer’s subjective mindset. However, the proposed test for 
visual metaphor, in seeking one or more features from the source domain 
as mapping onto the target domain, should serve as a useful heuristic for 
what consumers may be thinking in regard to a given image mark. Of 
course, “[w]e should never forget that relevance and meaning can never 
be measured objectively: relevance is always relevance to an 
individual.”286 Trademark—especially in its imaginal, inner, and 
subjective aspects—is unfortunately not a concrete area of the law.287 
B. Import of the Imagination Test 
The proposal may also be criticized based on its (partial) import of the 
Abercrombie spectrum, which has been oft-criticized in trademark law.288 
For all its flaws, though, Abercrombie provides a certain amount of 
predictability and a general framework for evaluating a terribly difficult 
area—how marks are perceived by the consumer in his or her subjective 
imagination. Called “[t]he most ‘intellectual’ of the intellectual properties, 
trademarks are a property purely of consumers’ minds.”289 
                                                     
285. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 781, 784–85 (2008) (noting that “in trademark law, we are considering the (re)actions of 
potentially millions of consumers. So . . . trademark law must of necessity take certain shortcuts to 
ensure that litigation does not devolve into a morass of evidentiary issues; true, too, that in a field 
(law) that depends on precedent for efficient private ordering, there must be certain general rules that 
can be derived and followed” (citing Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark 
Law, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 140, 148 (J. Ginsburg et al. 
eds., 2007))). 
286. Forceville, supra note 59, at 38 (citations omitted). 
287. See Beebe, supra note 155, at 2021. 
288. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Abercrombie 2.0–Can We Get There from Here? Thoughts on 
“Suggestive Fair Use,” 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 1 (2016).  
289. Beebe, supra note 155, at 2021. 
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From an economic perspective, it has been argued that abandoning the 
relative simplicity of the Abercrombie spectrum would have negative 
consequences: 
Abandoning the simplicity of the Abercrombie spectrum will 
increase administrative costs, and increased administrative costs 
can serve as a barrier to entry for some plaintiffs. If a firm cannot 
protect a mark without presenting evidence of source 
significance, it will take the firm longer to settle its claim to the 
mark. The delay can be costly. In addition, amassing evidence of 
source significance is itself a costly endeavor. But the accuracy 
of the Abercrombie spectrum has recently been called into 
question. This is in part because judges with limited information 
designed the spectrum as a cost-saving mechanism, and in part 
because reduced administrative costs typically correlate with 
increased error costs. By definition, rules and rule-like proxies 
both over- and under-correct. The Abercrombie categories serve 
as a shortcut for the inquiry that we would prefer to pursue in a 
costless universe.290 
And, from a practical lens, the Abercrombie framework is unlikely to 
change substantially, lest be eliminated entirely. As Joseph S. Miller 
notes, “the Abercrombie hierarchy of distinctiveness for trademarks—
approaching its fortieth birthday with citations in more than 850 cases and 
more than 580 law review pieces, now the dominant framework for 
classifying the conceptual strength of word marks—looks more than stout 
enough to weather a pitched knife fight without a scratch.”291 
C. Symbolic Consumption 
Commentators have increasingly debated the effect that the language 
of consumption—and, by extension, symbolic consumption in the image 
mark context—has on culture and thus the public interest.292 Katya Assaf 
has written extensively on this issue and notes that commodification, 
                                                     
290. Linford, supra note 19, at 759–60. 
291. Miller, supra note 288, at 1. 
292. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 117, at 1183 (explaining that “[a]dvertising has two main 
functions, to inform and to persuade,” and that the law should not protect the latter because it 
disadvantages competition and gives to society no corresponding public benefit); Jessica Litman, 
Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1735 (1999) 
(remarking that “[w]hile there is nothing wrong with encouraging Warner Brothers to sell the public 
on atmospherics and to devise clever ways to exploit those atmospherics commercially, neither 
incentive theory nor moral desert offers a reason to protect them from competition”). 
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especially in its figurative aspect, has deleterious effects on culture.293 
Assaf points out that a trademark’s meaning is most often created by 
metaphorically linking a mark to various cultural signs and symbols 
totally unrelated to its use in commerce.294 By incentivizing creativity 
with higher degrees of protection, trademark law, and the imagination test 
particularly, can be seen to encourage this practice. Often, trademarks 
absorb the meaning and values contained within symbols for no rational, 
economic reasons.295 According to Assaf, this leads to a diluted and 
commodified culture in the form of “brand fetishism”: the phenomenon 
of consumers perceiving brands and trademarks as “spiritual entities” 
rather than informational devices.296  
Assaf’s point is well taken. Extending such a legal framework to image 
marks—which are archetypal and deep-seated in the consumer 
imagination—would perhaps serve to further incentivize imaginative 
branding and hence consumers’ “magical thinking” regarding trade 
symbols.297 Indeed, as Jean Baudrillard writes, 
Like every great myth worth its salt, the myth of “Consumption” 
has its discourse and its anti-discourse. In other words, the elated 
discourse on affluence is everywhere shadowed by a morose, 
moralizing, “critical” counter-discourse on the ravages of 
consumer society and the tragic end to which it inevitably dooms 
society as a whole.298  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has envisioned metaphor as integral to the threshold 
determination of distinctiveness for both word and image marks. The 
current baseline for word mark validity is already metaphor—the 
imagination test used to determine inherent distinctiveness requires a 
verbal metaphor (i.e., a figure of speech) between the mark and its 
underlying product or service. From a doctrinal perspective, this is 
accurate given that trademarks must be symbols, and figurative 
significance is required to meet the definition of a symbol. Yet, there is 
                                                     
293. See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1 (2008). 
294. See id.  
295. See id.  
296. Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 147–48 (2010); see also Katya Assaf, 
Magical Thinking in Trademark Law, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 595, 596 (2012) (likening the aesthetic 
function of trademarks to a form of magical thinking resembling a totemic religion).  
297. Assaf, Magical Thinking, supra note 296, at 596. 
298. See BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES, supra note 120, at 
212. 
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no uniform, coherent test for evaluating the distinctiveness of image 
marks. In having noted that metaphor refers to a phenomenon of thought 
rather than merely of language, though, visual metaphor is an extension 
that seems to fit quite well into the distinctiveness framework. 
This Article’s intended contributions to the literature are threefold. 
First, it has conceived of metaphor as a central consideration in analyzing 
the inherent distinctiveness of both word and image marks. Second, from 
a doctrinal standpoint, the Article has attempted to replicate for images 
the modicum of predictability present in the Abercrombie spectrum’s 
word mark framework as it pertains to a mark’s validity. Finally, the 
proposal put forward in this Article is envisioned as a starting point, of 
which optimistically a more robust future dialogue on the meaning of 
images in trademark and advertising law will follow. But currently the 
law is encased in deep fog with respect to its understanding of images.299 
It is hoped that this Article will lift a metaphorical layer of that fog. 
 
 
 
                                                     
299. See Porter, supra note 8.  
